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Abstract 
 
 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate how public Swedish family firms managed to 
perform during the most recent recession that started in 2008. Accounting data is combined 
with information regarding ownership structure to examine family firms’ performance in 
comparison to non-family firms. Our evidence implies that family firms perform better in 
terms of operating performance (return on asset) relative to other public firms. Our study also 
establishes that family firms perform at their best when the company founder is still active 
within the firm. Further, the thesis also suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
enhanced control ownership and operative performance, which implies that the family 
advantage is not completely distinguishable.  
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METHODOLOGY We perform a set of panel data regressions to analyse operating- and 
market based performance. In addition to this, we present thorough 
descriptive statistics that we combine with the regression analysis to 
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THEORETICAL  
PERSPECTIVES The theories applied in this study are substantially based upon the 
competitive advantages of family firms, as well more renowned 
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EMPIRICAL  
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Chapter I – Introduction 
In the first chapter, the reader is introduced to the subject area of this thesis. Further, the 
chapter will raise a few questions regarding family ownership and its impact on firm 
performance and ultimately present the reader with the purpose of this study.  
1.1 Background 
 
Studies of family firms offer a wide range of discoveries and interesting topics throughout the 
world of corporate finance. Many studies focus on the competitive advantages of running a 
family business, pointing out how their financial incentives and unique working environments 
can improve corporate value. In 2003, Ronald Anderson and David Reeb published an article 
on the subject in The Journal of Finance, where they established how family owned firms 
outperform other firms, especially in the presence of the company founder.   
 
Moreover, there are a few reasons to believe that family owned firms inherently possess some 
characteristics regarding business structure, strategy and management as opposed to large 
block holders such as private investors, venture capitalists, states or financial institutions.  For 
instance, a family shareholder finds a key relationship between personal wealth and the value 
of the company. In other words, the family firm is a long-term investment that represents the 
family legacy, and the investment horizons and business strategies of family firms are 
therefore longer (Poutziouris et al., 2006; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Brokaw & Murphy, 
1992). 
 
The theory of families’ long investment horizons brings a different nuance to the debate that 
Michael E. Porter shed light upon in 1992, where he emphasised short investment horizons as 
one of the major shortcomings of the U.S market during the late 20
th
 century. The reasons for 
this were, as he put it, that the system had grown to become even more complex and that 
investment decisions were driven more by external stakeholders or governmental regulations 
than by personal incentives. Porter highlighted the increasing competitive advantages of 
maintaining ‘patient capital’ within the business. The mere fact that the average stock holding 
periods had declined, from being more than seven years during the 1960s to being only two 
years in the early 1990s, was one of Porters arguments for why longer horizons ought to 
create competitive advantages (Porter, 1992).   
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For a long time, financial researchers have devoted a lot of attention to studies of publicly 
listed, large and widely held companies. As it turns out, most firms around the world have a 
dominant owner – in many instances the founding family (Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). As it also 
appears that investment horizons ought to differ in the case of family owned firms, research 
have focused on translating such business characteristics to actual results. Family business 
scholars often refer to the study of Villalonga & Amit (2006) – an article that presented 
evidence of the superior market performance of family firms compared to regular firms in the 
United States. Another similar study at that point of time was that of Maury (2006), 
establishing that European family firms outperform the market in terms of operational 
performance. As of the beginning of the 21
st
 century, plenty of renowned family firm studies 
in different countries had managed to establish that public family firms enjoy performance 
advantages in comparison to non-family firms. Regardless of these results, it is still not 
obvious whether these findings apply to the Swedish market, despite the country’s high 
frequency of family owned firms. In 1999, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer showed 
that concentrated ownership through family control is common in almost all developed 
countries. The older and more traditional view of Berle and Means (1932), which implied a 
separation of ownership and control because of dispersed ownership, is nowadays more often 
found in the USA and the UK.  Sweden, however, provides an interesting case with the 
highest frequency of dual-shares in the entire world, as well as second highest frequency of 
pyramidal structures as of the late 20
th
 century (La Porta, et al., 1999). In such a relatively 
small country as Sweden, a handful of families, with perhaps the Wallenberg family as the 
most notable, can exercise large influence in many listed Swedish firms.  
 
Henceforth, there is a willingness to explore the elements behind the family firm 
competiveness. Research implies that several factors differ from non-family firms, such as 
more consistent management goals, influence of family network and culture and increased 
resilience to hostile takeovers (Poutziouris et al., 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Conversely, some research highlight differences that may not be only positive. For instance, 
Ward (1997) describes that family firms despite their competitive advantages are often slow 
moving ‘steady old ships’ that have lower growth potential than regular firms. Meanwhile, 
other scholars argue that such drawbacks in family firms are merely consequences when 
exercising longer investment horizons, which ought to be advantageous in a long perspective 
(James 1999; Stein 1989). Kashmiri & Mahajan (2013) described the extended view of 
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investments and decisions in family firms as a natural outcome based on family ties and being 
loyal towards your family. Also, these ties remain over succeeding generations and grant the 
family firms with an increased incentive to care for the family legacy. Therefore, family 
executives tend to see their family business as a long-term investment to pass on to 
generations to come (Casson, 1999; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). In other words, 
strategic decisions in family firms tend to be driven less by short-term goals and achievements 
and more by long horizon interest of family’s succeeding generations, thus increasing the 
firms’ resilience to market fluctuations (Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2013). Furthermore, studies in 
the United States and Europe also conclude that family owners value the firm’s continued 
viability rather than reaching target goals of growth or carrying out dividend to the 
shareholders (Poutziouris, et al., 2006). 
 
Even if there appears to a common consent regarding the family firm performance advantage, 
some studies choose to break down the ingredients of family control into somewhat 
contradicting evidence. Anderson & Reeb (2003) and Villalonga & Amit (2006) jointly 
highlights how family firm performs at best in presence of the company founder as CEO, 
whereas other studies point to a neutral relationship (Ehrhardt, et al., 2006) or even a negative 
impact on firm performance (Bennedsen, et al., 2007). Altogether, there appears to be a 
consensus of entrepreneurial advantages in young family firms that translate into good 
performance when the founder of a family firm is still active within the company. 
Interestingly though, it is easy to debate how older firms have endured economic cycle(s) 
before and therefore ought to be more resilient in a macroeconomic downturn than younger 
firms. However, there is no apparent evidence regarding family founder effect on 
performance during financial recession.  
 
1.2 Problem Discussion and Thesis Contribution 
 
These theories urge one to find more evidence. The research at hand implies that there is 
conclusive evidence of a certain amount of endurance in family firms that separates them 
from the regular market. As has been noted, theory suggests that family firms ought to be 
more long-term oriented and able to bring an element of security to the firm even in times of 
high market uncertainty. Earlier studies have explored these differences between family and 
non-family companies during periods of no recession, such as the ones of 1992-1999 
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(Anderson & Reeb, 2003), 1994-2000 (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) or 1992-2002 (Lee, 2006). 
Ultimately, it is not obvious whether family firms perform better than non-family firms during 
times longer periods of market contraction.  
On the contrary, one could wonder why it is of importance to evaluate family firm 
performance specifically during times of global financial crises. First of all, economic 
recessions are re-occurring events that come around frequently in all major global economies.  
The consequences and the frequency of crises make them a valid subject of study let alone in 
their own right. Similarly, strategies that help companies improve profit and firm value during 
growth cycles are not often the same as those that make firms able to maintain good 
performance during recessions (Srinivasan, et al., 2011). One could also argue that a long-
term strategy ought to encounter stressful cycles eventually, if the company is intended to 
pass on for succeeding generations. Still, businesses with successful strategies and 
competitive advantages have many times fallen behind their competitors during times of 
financial crisis since they failed to adjust their strategies to endure such events (Bajeva, et al., 
2002).  
 
In short, family firms are likely not only to outperform other firms during times of no 
recession – they also appear to have incentives of running a long-term and viable business 
strategy over generations. There is however little evidence regarding the performance of 
family firms during times of recessions and high market uncertainty. Additional empirical 
evidence on the subject would therefore be of helpful contribution in cycles to come. This 
thesis will explore the performance of publicly listed family firms compared to non-family 
firms in Sweden during the most recent recession. In addition to this, the study will 
investigate how the family firm performance is affected if the company founder is still active 
within the firm. To thoroughly distinguish such effect, the thesis will also test a contradicting 
argument of how firm age ought to improve company performance in times of recession.  
 
Further, if theory suggests that family firms possess a unique set of characteristics that 
enhances their performance, there are also more observable mechanisms of a family firm that 
ought to be highlighted as well. For instance, as noted by La Porta et al, family firms tend to 
exercise high frequencies of pyramidal ownership structures and excessive voting rights – 
which is particularly common in Sweden but perhaps not generally an acclaimed international 
practice. Still, if the theories regarding performance of family firms is perceived as accurate, 
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one could also ponder whether family firm performance origins from the family or simply 
from the ownership control itself – a critique that we aim to control for in this thesis.  
 
Another central item in every study of family firms is how the scholar choses to define the 
family firm. In this study, a family firm is identified if the founder of any given firm or a 
close relative of his/hers hold at least 25 % or more of the voting shares. In addition to this, a 
family firm can be defined by having a member of the founding family in the top management 
team or board of directors as well. A thorough discussion of the family firm definition will be 
given in the third chapter.  
 
1.3 Purpose 
 
Earlier studies suggest that family firms often outperform non-family firms. Theory also 
suggests that family firms have incentives of running a sustainable long-term business 
strategy with a focus on maintaining a viable business over generations and in like manner 
also over business cycles. Therefore, the authors of this study seek to examine whether family 
firms performed better than non-family firms did during the most recent macroeconomic 
recession. 
 
In addition to this, the study also seeks to test previous performance findings regarding the 
impact of the family firm founder, but in a Swedish context of market recession. In order to 
distinguish that impact, we will also study how firm age affects overall firm performance 
during such circumstances.  
Lastly, in order for us to draw adequate conclusions regarding the family firm performance, 
we will also investigate the connection between ownership control and overall firm 
performance.  
 
1.4 Audience 
 
This study is essentially directed towards students and scholars of business and finance. 
Equally so, the authors of this study hope that this thesis will provide help and guidance to 
anyone that is conducting research in the field of family business.   
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Chapter II – The Natures of Family Firms and Recessions 
This section provides a more thorough understanding of the uniqueness of family firms and 
especially their effect on company performance. The chapter ends with a discussion of 
recessions, with a focus on the recent cycle that we aim to examine.  
2.1 Behaviours of Family Firms 
 
For the last 30 years, the family business research field has evolved immensely. Studies have 
progressed from understanding the family business organizational composition to measure 
their performance capabilities. Early notable contributions focus on the systematic nature of 
family firm behaviour (Davis & Stern, 1980; Brown & Whiteside, 1991), whereas more 
recent studies tend to search for more evidence of the distinctive operational and managerial 
advantages of running a family business (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Despite all negative publicity over the years that often illuminate the tearing conflicts within 
families’ corporate empires, the general scientific take on family firms is that they are more 
likely to succeed than any other kind of business (Brokaw & Murphy, 1992).  
The probably most consistent argument for this positive view of the family business is their 
urge to create multigenerational success, resulting in unique competitive advantages and 
often-superior firm performance (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). 
 
“Family firms breed sacrifice – 
And resilience in tough times” 
Brokaw & Murphy (1992) – ‘Why family businesses are best’ (p.74) 
 
So, why does not all firms apply the successful recipe of family firms? The answer is that the 
extraordinary nature of family firms is difficult to replicate. The family firm fosters a family-
oriented workplace and is as a result of this it often described as a completely unique working 
environment. Moreover, the family company is often referred to as the caring company, 
offering great employee care and as a result of this maintain great employee trust and loyalty 
(Ward, 1988).  
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2.2 Performance Capabilities 
 
These family firm characteristics often translate into high productivity and efficiency, which 
ultimately has its foundation in the concentration of shares a family holds at hand. This has 
been asserted to increase the sense of mission and long-term goals, since these shares directly 
represent the private wealth of the family name (Moscetello, 1990; Aronoff & Ward, 1994). 
Broadly speaking, family controlled firms make greater commitments to their mission and 
have the ability of sustaining higher amounts of self-analysis, with lesser impact of 
managerial politics. They find a direct link between family prosperity and company 
performance, hence possess unique incentives to sustain a viable business over a long time 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The process of family business performance (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) 
 
As stated in figure 2.1 above, the family firm characteristics make for multiple benefits that 
eventually translate into company performance. Some of the advantages are pure results of 
traditional customer perceptions of family ownership. That is to say, that people who do 
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business with family members have no reason to doubt the motives of their counterpart 
(Brokaw & Murphy, 1992). The long and prosperous relationship between a family and its 
customers, suppliers and other external stakeholders create efficiencies that will have 
significant impact on company performance (Habbershon & Williams, 1999).  
 
2.3 The Endurance Factor 
 
Again, let us discuss how family firms apply longer horizon goals in their business strategy 
than other companies do. Since the family firm represents the family legacy it differs from 
regular companies in many ways, as they do not strive for reaching target growth or realizing 
excessive return for shareholders (Poutziouris, et al., 2006). Instead, in completely reverse 
manner, family firms invest in a unique kind of durability - giving up excessive return just to 
sustain firm viability, if necessary. Members of a family in a certain business are often willing 
to give up pay, time and status for the sacrifice of the firm (Brokaw & Murphy, 1992).  
The business strategy of a family firm is said to be inseparable to the family objectives, hence 
creating a unity in the firm’s long-term vision and enhances their commitment to fulfil it.  
 
Such evidence regarding family firm resilience makes it possible to see the link between other 
family firm theories regarding their endurance ability - especially through rough market 
conditions. Ward (1997) suggests that family firms are less reactive to economic cycles and 
Donckels & Frohlich (1991) imply that family firms respond best to busniess environmental 
changes, thus are less dependent on the macroenvironment and less susceptible to negative 
cycles.  
Altogether, theory suggests that family firms outperform non-family firms during times of 
macroeconomic downturn due to singular abilities. There is plenty of evidence for the 
superior performance of family firms versus non-family firms or the market as a whole – but 
then again no conclusive proof of family firms being superior during financial recession. This 
is interesting, since both logic and theory dictates that the family impact ought to be of 
importance in times of economic uncertainty.   
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2.4 Ownership Structures 
 
An important element when studying family firms is the close examination and understanding 
of the different types of ownership structures that characterises family firms. Even though the 
research field of family firms is relatively unexplored, it has grown a lot in complexity over 
the years. Again, a study is not simply conducted by picking a sample of family firms from 
any given list; every study has its own definition and any altering of it will have an impact on 
the result (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). To give the reader a 
more concrete understanding of the sometimes-advanced ownership structures, a few 
examples of Swedish family ownership structures are demonstrated in sections 2.4.1 and 
2.4.2.  
 
2.4.1 Dual-Class Shares 
 
Dual-class stock (also known as dual equity) means that a company applies an equity 
structure that divides their shares into two or more different classes, often named A-shares 
and B-shares. Most firms, especially in Sweden, apply a system where the high voting A-
shares typically translate to one share being equal to one vote, – whereas the low voting B-
shares typically translates to 1/10 of a vote (Holmén, 2005).  
However, since our aim is to investigate the impact of family control, the voting percentages 
carried through either A- or B-class shares are of particular interest to us. Again, the 
distribution is very company specific and it is of great importance that one recognizes whether 
a company apply a dual-share system in order to obtain a reliable firm sample.  
In tables 2.1 and 2.2 are two examples of ownership structure in two of the largest family 
firms in Sweden.  
 
Largest block holders Amount of shares % of votes % of capital 
Fam Persson AB 623 849 332 69,71 37,69 
Lottie Tham  88 080 400 2,59 5,32 
Alecta  64 840 000 1,90 3,92 
Swedbank  45 988 720 1,35 1,91 
Table 2.1: H&M largest block holders. Source: H&M annual report 2011 (Hennes & Mauritz AB, 2012) 
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As demonstrated in table 2.1, the main owner of H&M, Fam Persson AB, possesses the vast 
majority of votes in the firm (69,71 %). Yet, their portion of the cash flow rights is 37,69 %, 
which in this study still classifies as a family firm, but translates to almost twice its proportion 
in votes. That is to say, initially one could be misled through only observing the percentage of 
cash flow rights, as it is not clear how this translates to amount of votes. Nevertheless, by 
manually looking through the company annual reports, the correct percentage of votes are 
displayed – even though the distribution of dual class shares is not specified.  
 
 
Largest block 
holders 
% of 
capital 
% of 
votes 
Total 
shares 
A-shares B-shares 
FAM AB 12,9 29,0 58 850 000 19 050 000 39 800 000 
Alecta 2,1 3,7 9 566 552 2 191 404 7 374 148 
Harris Ass. 5,1 2,9 23 019 148 0 23 019 148 
Skandia Liv 0,6 2,7 2 649 243 2 084 821 564 422 
AFA Försäk. 1,6 2,5 7 165 971 1 378 300 5 787 671 
Table 2.2: SKF AB largest block holders. Source: SKF annual report 2013. (SKF AB, 2014) 
 
In table 2.2, one may be able to recognize a similar pitfall, as most of the software that 
provide company data present the ownership structure as percentage of capital. Initially then, 
the researcher may fail to classify SFK AB as a family firm. However, a more thorough 
observation of annual reports clearly states the opposite, since the 12,9 % that Fam AB holds 
will translate into 29,0 % of votes. The table also illustrates the potency of A-shares, since 
Harris Associates Fonder holds the second largest amount of shares in total only through their 
B-shares. Yet, their missing of A-shares leaves them with merely 2,9 percentages of votes – 
which is one tenth of Fam AB’s voting percentage.  
 
Again, the information that is provided is very company specific. For instance, SFK AB gives 
a clear overview of the distribution of dual-shares, whereas H&M chose not to specify it. In 
other words, conducting a study on this subject is challenging and attention to detail is 
essential in order to obtain reliable results (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).   
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2.4.2 Pyramidal Holdings 
 
In large parts of the world, complex ownership structures can often be illustrated through the 
shape of a pyramid – therefore referred to as pyramidal holdings or pyramidal ownership 
structures. The firms involved in these types of business groups are controlled through a 
chain of companies – a hierarchy of sort. Let us pretend that firm A holds a large part of firm 
B’s shares, which in turn holds a large proportion of firm C’s shares. The ultimate owner of 
the pyramid, who controls firm A and is therefore also in control of firms B and C, is often a 
wealthy family (La Porta, et al., 1999; Riyanto & Toolsema, 2008).  
 
As one may expect, pyramidal ownership structures are not particularly rare in Sweden and 
also occur frequently through this research. Since this paper is limited to the largest public 
companies in Sweden, the presence of the most notable families or “family-spheres” ought to 
be recognized and thoroughly studied. By obtaining good insight of the largest ownership 
spheres on the market, the feasibility of the research should be greatly enhanced (Sund & 
Ljungström, 2011). Figure 2.2 displays a simplified illustration of the Wallenberg sphere in 
Sweden.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Pyramidal holdings illustrated through the Wallenberg sphere. Source: (Wallenbergstiftelserna, 
2015) 
 
As can be seen in figure 2.2, the Wallenberg foundation (Wallenbergstiftelserna) in Sweden is 
a collection name for the foundations created through the years by members of the 
Wallenbergstiftelserna 
Investor AB 
Husqvarna AB 
(Hired management) 
Ericsson AB 
(Non-family 
firm) 
FAM AB 
AB SKF 
(Descandant-
controlled) 
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Wallenberg family. The sphere controls two major investment companies, Foundation Asset 
Management AB (FAM AB) and Investor AB. These firms hold a large amount of shares in 
several publicly listed Swedish companies, a few of which can be seen above, in what has 
turned out to be a pyramidal shape.  
Remember that our definition of a family firm involves a concentration of 25 % of voting 
shares tied to the family, either directly or through a pyramidal structure such as this one. In 
other words, the firms in the lower levels of the pyramid should by no means be directly 
classified as family firms. For instance, Investor AB holds an average of 21,50 % of votes in 
Ericsson AB during our time period and is therefore not to be defined as a family firm. Here, 
it is important to know that investment and holding companies are excluded from the sample, 
thus no classification of Investor AB or FAM AB. The data sample and its limitations will be 
discussed more thoroughly in the fourth chapter. In addition, a more thorough discussion of 
our chosen family firm definition will be given in the beginning of the third chapter.   
 
Altogether, as exemplified in sections 2.4.1 & 2.4.2, family firms can implement a range of 
corporate governance mechanisms in order to exercise comprehensive control over the firm. 
On a relatively small market, such as Sweden, the scholar is able to get an improved 
understanding about the common structures and relations within the family spheres, which 
ought to enhance the credibility of the research. 
 
2.5 Elements of Macroeconomic Recession 
 
Allow us to turn back the time to many decades ago – more specifically to the year of 1936. 
John Maynard Keynes published ‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money’ 
in which he sought to demonstrate the inadequate balance between total production and 
demand. He argued that the lack of balance and passive financial politics would result in 
prolonged periods of low productivity and high unemployment, or what we today refer to as a 
macroeconomic recession. If these elements would be perceived as accurate, logic dictates 
that firms ought to experience lower performance during times of recession. These are the 
underlying arguments that make the foundation of our thesis, which will further investigate if 
family firms have a higher degree of resistance to such negative downturns.  
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Still, one may ask the question: Why should family firm performance differ particularly in 
times of economic recession? First, market recessions trigger a unique company behaviour 
that is likely to differ between family firms and non-family firms (Kashmiri & Mahajan, 
2013). Secondly, - and this is the central argument throughout the thesis - family executives 
are keener on implementing longer investment horizons that ought to last over market cycles 
(Brokaw, 1992; Maury, 2006; Donckels & Frohlich, 1991; Ward, 1997). Given this 
perspective, we expect family firms to have adopted a unique resilience towards 
macroeconomic downturn and thus outperform non-family firms under such circumstances. 
 
On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, studies point to some unique family firm 
abilities that are, as Ward (1988) phrases it, ‘unquantifiable’. The working environment is 
said to foster a family-oriented and friendly workplace, as well as maintaining great employee 
care (Habbershon & Williams, 1999 ;Ward, 1988). Accordingly so, we find great relevance in 
conducting a study of family firms and more specifically during times of financial crisis.  
 
2.5.1 The Recent Recession and the Eurozone Crisis 
 
On September 15, 2008, the American bank Lehman Brothers went into bankruptcy. That 
would turn out to be the ignition of what is often referred to as the largest global recession 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Fernando, et al., 2012). Shortly thereafter, the 
recession reached Europe and Sweden. In early 2009, the Swedish Central Bank (Sveriges 
Riksbank) highlighted how Sweden, as a small open economy would remain highly 
dependent on global economic circumstances and that tough years were waiting ahead for the 
Swedish companies (Öberg, vice Governor of the Swedish Central Bank, 2009).  
In 2010 however, the Swedish industry had started recovering and as illustrated in figure 2.3 
below, the country’s total unemployment had decreased almost an entire percentage unit 
during the year (SCB, 2011). And so, in the spring of 2011 the Governor of the Swedish 
Central Bank assessed the recession to be over (Sveriges Riksbank, 2012). Interestingly 
though, the statement was made during the breakout of what today is more commonly 
referred to as the Eurozone crisis. The Governor, Stefan Ingves, explained that the purchasing 
power of the Swedish Crown would remain strong enough to leave Sweden out of the 
steeping Eurozone economies.   
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“The modern financial crisis is over” 
- Stefan Ingves, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank 
March 2011 
 
Today, four years later, one could argue that the recession in Sweden was not at all over, but 
merely on a temporary pause. Once again, the recent turns of events are fairly simple to 
identify in figure 2.3. As the Eurozone crisis stroke hard on many European countries, 
Sweden managed to momentarily avoid any major market downturn.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Unemployment in Sweden 2008-2014 including trend line.  
Source: Statistiska Centralbyrån (2015) 
 
Admittedly, levels of total unemployment do not necessarily mirror all elements of a given 
cycle, but one could still identify how the Swedish market is struggling to reach the same low 
level of unemployment as they had before the recession of 2008.  
 
In summary, it is important to understand that any research under extreme market conditions, 
such as these, require additional wariness when analysing the results. Every cycle is unique 
and its impact on the results cannot be approached in any general fashion. The above-
mentioned points will be taken into consideration when we analyse the results of our sample 
period later on in this thesis.  
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Chapter III – Theoretical framework 
The third chapter will present the reader with the theoretical background that serves as the 
foundation for this research. We start by discussing the family firm definition and then 
highlight some of the most renowned family firm studies. The chapter ends by formulating the 
empirical hypotheses that we will test for in this thesis.  
3.1 Defining the Family Firm 
 
In order to conduct a study on this subject, the first matter at hand is to define: what is a 
family firm? The interpretation has varied over the last decades of family research and it 
appears that there is still no precise or superior definition of the family firm. According to 
Habbershon & Williams (1999) most research papers during the end of the 20
th
 century chose 
their own takes on the definition of “family business” - each of which offered a slightly 
different nuance. Even though many studies provided a clear definition of the family firm, it 
was often unclear whether all firms outside the definition were classified as non-family firms 
and if the family firms enjoyed the same family advantages. As a consequence of this lack of 
clarity, the family research field has suffered from a credibility gap and has been target for 
academic criticism. By the same token, many family businesses have experienced frustration, 
as they wonder why they have not experienced the presumable advantages of other family 
firms.  
 
Often through previous research, a family firm is defined as a company where the “founder or 
a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, director, or block 
holder, either individually or as a group” (Villalonga & Amit, 2006, p. 389). Villalonga & 
Amit uses this definition for the main purpose of their article and later compare the results 
with further restrictions regarding the classification of family firms. These restrictions include 
“a threshold of 20 % of the votes, being the largest shareholder or vote holder, having family 
officers or directors, or being in second or later generations” (Villalonga & Amit 2006, 
p.389). It is easy to see the problem of conducting research without the use of such 
restrictions. For instance, a company where the founder is still in charge is in no strict 
definition a family firm, since the company is perhaps not destined to pass on to his or her 
heirs. Further, one can question the validity of any given results if the family does not have 
the majority of voting shares and thereby the family’s influence on company results. 
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Andres (2009) uses a more numerical definition. He simply uses two criteria that can define a 
family firm: (1) the founder or a relative of the founder holds more than 25 % of the total 
amount of voting shares, or (2) the founding family has a representative on the executive or 
the supervisory board if they do not meet the 25 % of voting shares requirement in (1). He 
also states that the process of identifying the firms that are to be included in the sample varies 
in difficulty. The firms that still have an active founder are easily identified due to the strong 
connection the founder has with the firm’s identity and the fact that they are usually relatively 
young firms. Problems occur when the family connection is harder to identify due to a longer 
presence in the firm. These problems can include surname changes or distant family members 
serving as board members. Andres explains that this will have to be checked manually 
through examination of annual statements, anniversary publications and other publicly 
available sources of information.  
 
Similarly, other studies (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008) break down the family firm 
variable into subcategories in order to examine how family control affects performance. A 
common division is illustrated in table 3.1.  
 
A) Founder-controlled firm – the founder still acts in the top-management team (TMT) 
or on the board of directors. 
B) Descendant-controlled firm – the founder is no longer active within the TMT or the 
board of directors, but has passed on the control to one of his or her descendants.   
C) Hired management – the firm is still categorized as a family firm but members of the 
family are no longer involved in the management or on the board of directors.  
Table 3.1: Family firms’ subcategories. Source: Andres (2008) 
 
Andre’s definition of a family firm is rather narrow and restrictive compared to similar studies 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Then again, it is a matter of 
interpretation and different studies often uses their own definition. La Porta et al (1999) 
defines the family firm as a firm where a family possesses at least 20 % of the shares while 
Böhren (2011) requires no less than 50 %. As mentioned earlier, the ultimate categorization 
on the definition of family firm is of big importance, as Villalonga & Amit (2006) concluded 
that their results were dependent on how they altered the definition.  
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This study will apply the definition by Andres (2009) to define the family firm by the two 
criteria regarding shares held. In short, this means that if the founder or a close relative to the 
founder holds 25 % or more of the voting shares and/or the founding family have a 
representative in the enterprise top management or board of directors, the firm will be 
classified as a family firm. Still, family owners may be hard to identify as they can “hide” in 
pyramids or complex dual-share structures (as discussed in 2.4). Therefore, if an institution 
holds 25 % or more of the voting shares in a company and the institution itself is controlled 
according to Andres (2009) criteria (1) or (2), the company will be defined as a family firm as 
well. This percentage should be high enough to ensure that the block holder can shut out 
minorities and also supply strong incentive to monitor the management and enhance their 
capability to exercise power over them. 
We have also divided the family firms into subcategories in accordance with if they are (A) 
founder-controlled, (B) descendant-controlled or (C) professionally managed. However, we 
have found that our sample, which consists of 62 family firms, had a too low frequency of 
hired management definitions (C) to draw any empirical conclusions. Therefore, we merged 
category (B) and (C) into ‘non-founder family firms’ - simply in order to examine the effect 
of founder control.   
 
3.2 Previous Research 
 
This section presents previous findings that we believe are relevant for our study. As there 
appears to be no conclusive evidence regarding family firm performance under 
macroeconomic difficulty, we will combine regular empirical findings of family firms with 
established theories of how they ought to perform during times of financial crisis. A summary 
of previous family firm studies can be found in table 3.2 below.  
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     Evidence of family control 
Authors Region of 
study 
Company type and 
window 
Metrics Results Founder Non-founder 
control 
Adams et al (2007) US Public 
1992-1999 
ROA/TQ +/+  +  
 Anderson & Reeb 
(2003) 
US Public 
1992-1999 
ROA/TQ +/+ +  
Andres (2008) Germany Public 
2003-2007 
ROA/TQ +/+ + - 
Barontini & Caprio 
(2006) 
Europe Public 
1999-2001 
ROA/TQ +/0 + 0 
Bennedsen et al (2007) Denmark Public & Private 
1994-2002 
ROA 0 - + 
Bennedsen & Nielsen 
(2005) 
Europe Public 
1996-1998 
ROA/TQ 0/-   
Cronqvist & Nilsson 
(2003) 
Sweden Public 
1991-1997 
ROA/TQ -/-   
Erhardt et al (2006) Germany Public 
1987-2003 
ROA + 0 0 
Kashmiri & Mahajan 
(2013) 
US Public 
2000-2009 
TQ + + 0 
Lee (2006) US Public 
1992-2002 
ROA/ROE +/0 + 0 
Maury (2006) Europe Public 
2002-2003 
ROA + + - 
Panunzi et al (2006) Italy Public 
1998-2003 
ROA/ROE/TQ +/+/+ + 0 
Sraer & Thesmar 
(2006) 
France Public 
1994-2000 
ROA/ROE +/+ + + 
Villalonga & Amit 
(2006) 
US Public 
1994-2000 
TQ + + - 
Table 3.2: Previous empirical evidence of family firm performance 
 
The previous findings are sorted into alphabetical order and the metrics used are Return on 
Asset (ROA), Tobin’s Q (TQ) and Return on Equity (ROE). The results are then illustrated 
through three different symbols (+, - and 0), which clarifies whether the variable showed 
positive, negative or neutral impact on performance metrics.  
In the three columns marked as Evidence of Family Control we note the found relationships 
between control and performance, given that such evidence was presented by that particular 
study.  
 
Overall, there appears to be a joint positive impact on performance by family firms. However, 
worth noting is the fact that the only recognized Swedish study on the matter indicates 
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negative performance results (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). Also notable is the fact that the 
founder category appears to have a concerted positive impact on family firm performance, 
whereas other family control categories present rather mixed findings.  
 
3.3 Swedish Family Firms 
 
Let us recall how we earlier determined Sweden as one of the more interesting markets in the 
world regarding family ownership. La Porta (1999) described Sweden as having the highest 
frequency of dual-shares and second highest frequency of pyramidal structures. Bebchuk et al 
(2000) argues that only South Africa competes with Sweden regarding these frequencies. On 
the other hand, many companies in Sweden are by our definition family firms, but most of 
them are private companies (IKEA is perhaps the most acquainted example of this).  
 
Nonetheless, Sweden is a relatively small market in comparison to where many other studies 
of family firms are conducted (United States, U.K, Germany, Japan etc.) and so the number of 
prominent families in Sweden is rather small, but they have significant impact on the market. 
Lundberg, Stenbeck, Rausing, Axel Johnson and Persson are a few examples of notable 
family names on the Swedish stock exchange (Holmén, 2005).  
 
In the last decade, two studies were made that addressed the impact of family ownership in 
publicly traded Swedish companies. These studies were quite different in their approach to the 
subject and so the results were rather mixed as well. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) studied 
309 Swedish listed firms between 1991 and 1997 and found that firms with controlling 
minority family shareholders performed worse in terms of return on asset (ROA) and Tobin’s 
Q. Regardless of these results, professors at Jönköpings International Business School found 
different evidence. In 2007, Bjuggren et al displayed how family controlled firms have a 
positive impact on performance, measured through marginal q, which is a slightly different 
approximation of Tobin’s Q. A few years later, Bjuggren & Palmgren (2010) continued their 
studies of Swedish family firms, this time by measuring investment performance. Once more, 
earlier research supported the view of family firms performing better than other firms.  
Then again, there is still an urge to find out whether the renowned family performance is 
applicable in an economic recession – which can be assumed to inquire for other abilities than 
normal market circumstances do.   
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3.4 The Family Impact 
 
One may suggest that theories about family firms are indeed nothing but theories, whereas in 
practice the firm behaviour is company specific regardless of ownership. The concrete 
question remains to be answered: Are family firms really different from other business 
organisations? As we established earlier, family owners favour their decision-making 
autonomy and the continued viability of the firm rather than achieving targeted growth or 
realizing excessive return for the shareholders. As a consequence, their risk behaviour is 
determined mainly by their incentive of remaining viable as well as their desire for strategic 
and managerial autonomy (Poutziouris, et al., 2006). Additionally, the family’s desire of 
protecting their control of the firm as well as their reputation is another key factor regarding 
the risk aversion of family firms. Given these points, family owners do not exercise the same 
attitude towards the firm’s aggregate risk as the common diversified shareholders do. Their 
investment risk is closely linked to the company’s aggregate risk, meaning any increase in 
probability of default is tied to a potential loss of their personal wealth. Hence, the risk 
aversion attitude of family owners is closer to that of managers than the neutral and 
diversified shareholder. (Nagar, et al., 2000).  
As a result of this, there is a similarity in the interests of managers (related to the owner’s 
family or not) and the family shareholders, a relationship that opposes the alignment of 
interests theory, formulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In this case, managers do not 
align their interest with those of the shareholders, but instead the reverse. Benjamin Maury 
(2006) found that family controlled firms outperform non-family ones by a significant degree, 
suggesting the low agency conflicts between managers and shareholders as a valid reason for 
this.   
On the other hand, the arguments of long term-orientation and stability in family firms appear 
to be the most central arguments in earlier research (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Casson, 1999; 
Danco, 1975; Holmén & Högfeldt, 2005; Lee, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). In addition to 
this, Villalonga & Amit (2006) adds evidence of how family firms run a more stable company 
culture through consistent management goals, resulting in an increased resilience to market 
fluctuations. Miguel Angel Gallo is a former chairman of the Family Business Chair where he 
specialized in the outcome of family firm ownership structure. In 1995, he concluded in The 
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Family Business Review that family firms are less connected to the global markets, an 
argument for why family firms are less affected by stressful macroeconomic circumstances.  
 
But before the formulation of our first hypotheses regarding family firm performance, it is 
important to define the performance itself that we ought to expect. In order to obtain results 
that are comparable to previous research, we will apply the two most common performance 
metrics: Return on Asset and Tobin’s Q. These metrics, however, have a quite different take 
on firm performance. Return on Asset is commonly argued to measure the operating 
performance of a firm, whilst Tobin’s Q is an approximation of firm market value.1 
Therefore, all of our hypotheses will have a two-folded approach in order to distinguish the 
family variable’s effect on both operating performance and market performance.  
 
Ultimately, in line with previous research and family business theory, we formulate our first 
two hypotheses: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
 
H1a: Family firms perform better than non-family firms during economic recession in terms 
of operating performance. 
 
H1b: Family firms perform better than non-family firms during economic recession in terms 
of market performance. 
 
3.5 The ‘Founder Effect’ 
 
As mentioned, founder-controlled firms seem to experience the most of family firm 
advantages, often referred to as the founder effect. Earlier research point out that when a 
descendant takes over the firm, firm market value is destroyed (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Overall, indications of previous research clearly suggest an overall consistency regarding 
founding family firm’s superior performance above other family firms (see table 3.2). 
                                                 
1
 A more thorough variable discussion will be provided in the fourth chapter.  
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However, despite the fact that research implies that value is destroyed in a descendant-
controlled firm or a family firm with hired management, there is still reason to believe that 
Sweden may provide an extraordinary case. Swedish publicly listed family firms are mainly 
structured through a small number of large spheres (e.g. figure 2.2) and so the firms in these 
spheres are often old, thus fairly familiar to changing market conditions. For obvious reasons, 
an older firm has proven its survivability through earlier cycles and the older (often 
descendant-controlled) family firms ought to enjoy a high degree of resistance to changing 
markets. Still, as mentioned, most of previous research suggests that the founding family 
firms are superior: but interestingly so, only through prosperous macroeconomic periods.   
 
There are however a few theories regarding the superior performance of founding family 
firms in comparison to other family firms, e.g. stated by J.L Ward (1988). More accurately, 
his theories point to the drawbacks when succeeding top positions within a family firm. His 
first theory is that of the weak successor, pointing at the inability to cope with the doubts and 
pressures when succeeding a very successful person prior to you. The unwillingness to 
disappoint others often affects decision-making and risk taking. The second factor is the 
sibling successor conflict. Just as the name indicates, the unique partnership of succeeding 
siblings can be a very costly process if serious disagreement occurs, often resulting in one part 
buying out the other at a tremendous cost of capital and growth potential. This also aligns 
with the third and final factor of disparate family goals – a factor that basically underlines the 
difficulty of reconciling the needs, values and goals of different family members of the 
succeeding generation (Ward, 1988).  
 
As mentioned, prior research indicates that an early life-stage listed family firm enjoys great 
benefits of entrepreneurial abilities and therefore can outperform the market in early years 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). However, in order to distinguish the founder effect in family firms 
from the general age effect on all firms, we will also investigate how firm age affects 
performance. That is to say, that age can be argued to have a positive impact on firms during 
recession due to the increased experience and endurance in the firm, but is quite contradictory 
to the theories of the founder effect. Kashmiri & Mahajan (2013) suggests that performance 
of public firms in the U.S market was positively driven by firm age during the most recent 
recession. This is an argument that appears quite logical. But altogether, to state that founding 
family firms simultaneously perform better together with old firms is rather contradicting, and 
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we therefore aim to test the arguments through two different hypotheses. Hypothesis 2a-b will 
test the previous empirics of how founding family firms perform better during regular market 
conditions, whilst 3a-b will test if old firms experience an advantageous performance through 
rough market cycles. Combining these two results ought to provide us with enough 
information to distinguish if founder control in family firm is ultimately advantageous in a 
market recession.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
 
H2a: Family firms with an active founder perform better than other family firms in terms of 
operating performance during recession. 
H2b: Family firms with an active founder perform better than other family firms in terms of 
market performance during recession. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 
 
H3a: Firm age has a positive impact on overall operating performance during recession. 
 
H3b: Firm age has a positive impact on overall market performance during recession. 
 
3.6 Separation of Ownership and Control 
 
Lastly, in order for this thesis to draw equitable conclusions, we must address the question: 
Does family ownership per se affect the firm performance or is it mainly depending on the 
ownership concentration, regardless of who the owner is? Berle and Means (1932) suggested 
that concentrated ownership ought to have a positive effect on firm value due to equivalent 
interest of managers and shareholders, a theory further developed by Fama & Jensen many 
years later.  In The Journal of Law and Economics, they investigate what organizational form 
that ought to survive through covering costs in a highly competitive market while reaching 
targeted levels of demand. Their initial assumption is that a company with separated risk-
bearers (i.e. major claimants of residuals) and controllers (i.e. decision managers) need to 
control agency problems to a larger extent than those firms who have smaller separation of 
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risk and control. They concluded, that an organizational form ought to survive when both 
agency costs and efficiency advantages of concentrated ownership results in the delivery of a 
product at a lower price than other ownership structures (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
As illustrated earlier in the second chapter, firms can exercise governance mechanisms, such 
as dual-class shares, in order to enhance ownership control. In other words, the voting 
ownership (control) does not necessarily mirror the capital ownership (cash flow rights), as 
demonstrated in table 2.1 and 2.2. That ownership separation is sometimes referred to as 
ownership wedge, which marks the difference between voting ownership and ordinary cash 
flow rights. Ownership enhancing mechanisms have displayed slightly mixed effects on firm 
performance. Panunzi et al (2006) established that enhanced voting ownership had a positive 
impact on firm performance, whereas Cronqvist & Nilsson (2003) established the direct 
opposite. However, Cronqvist & Nilsson also concluded that such control mechanisms are 
particularly common in family firms – similar to earlier mentioned theories by La Porta et al.  
 
Since wedge ultimately is connected to excessive firm control, this means that wedge also 
ought to capture the drivers of firm performance. We believe this is intriguing, since such 
argument is very similar to that of superior family firm performance. We already established 
how family owners inherently possess incentives of connecting company prosperity to family 
wealth – which ought to be advantageous in a recession. By the same token, non-family firms 
also ought to enjoy a positive effect of a committed owner. After all, a founder CEO of a 
family firm can have zero ownership in a firm and it still classifies as a family firm, whilst an 
institution may hold 40 % of votes in another firm and indeed be very committed to firm 
achievements.  
 
We believe this is a central critique against family firm performance research that we want to 
provide against in this study. Even though there is no doubt that family firms possess blood 
related incentives that other firms are unable to replicate, one should not ignore the fact that 
‘regular’ voting owners also can possess a strong sense of solidarity with the firm.  However, 
since family firms are keener on implementing control enhancement of ownership, the 
presence of ownership wedge ought to be very frequent in family firms. Still, it is a numerical 
measure of ownership commitment and not a classification of ownership type, like the family 
firm variable.  
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As we argue that firms ought to benefit from ownership commitment in a recession, we 
believe that wedge should have a positive impact on firm performance. In short, to properly 
analyse the family firm performance, we formulate our last two hypotheses: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4 
 
H4a: Enhanced ownership voting control has a positive impact on overall firm operating 
performance during recession. 
 
H4b: Enhanced ownership voting control has a positive impact on overall firm market 
performance during recession. 
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3.7 Summary of Theoretical Foundation 
 
Hypothesis Supporting Theory Supporting Evidence 
H1a: Family firms perform better than 
non-family firms during recession in 
terms of operating performance. 
H1b: Family firms perform better than 
non-family firms during economic 
recession in terms of market performance 
(Brokaw & Murphy, 
1992), (Donckels & 
Frohlich, 1991), 
(Ward, 1988), 
(Habbershon & 
Williams, 1999) 
(Anderson & Reeb, 
2003), (Maury, 2006), 
(Sraer & Thesmar, 
2007), (Panunzi, et al., 
2006) 
H2a: Family firms with an active founder 
perform better than other family firms in 
terms of operating performance during 
recession. 
H2b: Family firms with an active founder 
perform better than other family firms in 
terms of market performance during 
recession. 
(Ward, 1997) 
 
(Anderson & Reeb, 
2003), (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006), (Barontini 
& Caprio, 2006) 
H3a: Firm age has a positive impact on 
overall operating performance during 
recession. 
H3b: Firm age has a positive impact on 
overall market performance during 
recession.  
 (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003), (Kashmiri & 
Mahajan, 2013) 
H4a: Enhanced ownership voting control 
has a positive impact on overall firm 
operating performance during recession. 
H4b: Enhanced ownership voting control 
has a positive impact on overall firm 
market performance.  
(Berle & Means, 
1932), (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) 
(Panunzi, et al., 2006),  
(Barontini & Caprio, 
2006) 
Table 3.5: Summary of theoretical foundation   
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Chapter IV – Methodology 
This chapter will provide the reader with an understanding of the empirical methodology 
applied in this thesis. The first section will discuss the process of constructing the sample for 
the study, as well as present the different variables that are investigated. The section ends 
with a closer understanding of the estimation techniques used on the dataset. 
4.1 Research Approach 
 
This thesis aims to conduct a study regarding the performance and endurance of Swedish 
family firms during stressful macroeconomic circumstances; hence a deductive approach to 
the research (Patel & Davidsson, 1991). We will use a combination of descriptive statistics 
together with regression analysis to get a thorough understanding of the results. The reason 
for this combining approach is that our sample period is relatively unexplored and we 
therefore put additional weight into to the descriptive analysis in order to observe trends in the 
dataset. 
Our panel data regressions will be made in multiple specifications in order to draw adequate 
conclusions and improve the robustness of the study results. A complete methodology guide 
will be provided later in this chapter.  
Since key-metrics and performance measures are purely numeric, the collected data is solely 
quantitative. Correspondingly, the data is objective and interpretations ought to be quite 
straightforward.  
 
4.2 Constructing the Dataset 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, this research is conducted through a quantitative 
approach. This section provides a walk-through of the data collected as well as a presentation 
of the method applied to accomplish the research approach.  
 
4.2.1 Sample Overview 
 
The sample of this study consists of Swedish publicly listed companies during the time period 
of 2009 to 2013. The firms are traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, or more specifically 
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on the large-, mid- and small-cap lists. Since the purpose of this study is to evaluate firms’ 
resistance to the latest economic crisis, any company that was initially listed later than 2009 
will not be taken into consideration. Identically, any firm that has been unlisted or seized to 
exist during the time period has been excluded as well. Even though one could argue that 
these firms would be contributing to the thesis, their frequency is close to zero and their 
absence will not jeopardize the final result.  
Firms acting in the financial sector (banks, insurance companies, holding companies etc.) 
have also been subtracted from the sample. The reason for this is that these institutes often 
operate directly from legislation to maintain certain levels of financial ratios, thus potentially 
resulting in biased results. Likewise, medical research companies were cut from the sample, 
as their performance measures are highly dependent on success through research and 
therefore incomparable with the rest of the sample.  
Altogether, the final sample was equal to 139 firms including 62 family firms, resulting in a 
total of 695 observations for each variable over five years, given that no observations are 
missing. A more detailed list of observations will be provided in table 5.1.  
 
4.2.2 Sources of Data 
 
All data used to conduct this study is secondary and collected through two software 
programmes. Thomson DataStream was used for total sales and market capitalization. All 
other accounting data was collected through Thomson Reuters Eikon. In the few cases where 
these databases provided insufficient data, proxies were carried out manually through the 
companies’ annual reports. In addition, the annual reports provided us with information 
regarding firm ownership structure and management. A complete variable list will be 
provided later in this chapter.   
 
4.3 Criticism of Methodology 
 
As mentioned earlier, a central critique that all studies of family ownership have to endure is 
the question of comparability to previous research, mainly because of various altering in the 
family firm classification. This study also has a rather unique approach, by applying the 
family firm definition of Andres (2009) and largely the methodology of Anderson & Reeb 
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(2003). Under such circumstances, one may suggest that the study follows an inadequate 
pattern and that the results will not be comparable to previous research. The reason for our 
research approach is fairly simple. Even though Anderson & Reeb uses a 5 % ownership mark 
for the family firm definition, such demarcation would be inferior to replicate on the Swedish 
market because of its large number of family owners involved. By such classification in our 
thesis, there would be relatively few non-family firms left to compare our results to.  
Likewise, we believe that this type of study on the Swedish market relies on a greater degree 
of advanced implementation. Earlier scholars of family business often use ready-made and 
easily feasible information, such as the S&P 500 (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), Fortune-500 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006) or FTSE 100 (Poutziouris, et al., 2006). All data of this study had 
to be manually conducted and therefore adds an edge to the scientific contribution.   
 
4.4 Validity and Reliability 
 
Regardless of the field of study, it is of great importance to evaluate the methodology in order 
to establish credible results that can contribute to the scientific development in the research 
field. Eriksson & Wiedersheim-Paul (2014) describes two main aspects that every scholar 
should consider: validity and reliability. The first refers to the ability of the methodology to 
measure what it is supposed to measure and the latter stresses the importance of the 
methodology to supply reliable and trustworthy results. I.e., a study is reliable if the 
methodology provides the same result every time it is applied.  
 
Normally, when referring to validity in a research, the central argument is to prove how well 
the methodology solely serves the purpose of the thesis. We argue that our methodology is 
valid in the sense that it is influenced by renowned and reliable previous research and 
established theories of family firms, performance and recessions. In addition, scholars 
sometimes refer to two different distinctions of validity: internal and external (Lundahl & 
Skärvad, 1999).  
To achieve internal validity, there has to be a causal relationship between the sample and the 
variables. Our thesis has addressed this matter by only including firms who ought to be 
affected in a similar manner by the market recession (see 4.2.1 – Sample Overview). In 
addition, all firms are traded on the Swedish large-, mid- and small-cap lists and most 
variables have been adjusted for time and industry (see 4.7 – Industry and Time Adjustments).   
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External validity refers to the extent of which results can be generalized and applied to other 
situations. We argue that our thesis addresses this issue to a high degree, since additional 
hypotheses have been carefully formulated just in order to draw valid conclusions of our main 
inquiry, which is to investigate family firm performance during economic recession.  
 
In addition to this, we have also performed necessary data validity diagnostic tests (normal 
distribution of residuals, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity) to further strengthen the 
validity of the research. These tests are presented and discussed in section 5.4. 
 
To achieve reliability in a study, data has to be collected in a consistent way over similar 
samples, meaning that any scholar should be able to follow the outlined steps in order to 
replicate the study results. We argue that the software databases that are applied to this study 
are widely used by academics in the field of finance and therefore of high reliability. 
However, since we have applied Andres’ (2009) family firm criteria manually on each firm 
by investigating the ownership structure, there is still a possibility of data error. As already 
pointed out, there is no given list of family firms and the estimation technique is not 
straightforward by any means. Family firms can sometimes appear to ‘hide’ in complicated 
ownership structures, distant relatives or surname changes. The exactitude is therefore mainly 
relying on the author to perform thorough investigation of the company history and ownership 
background.  
Regardless of this critique, we judge that our estimations are thorough and that possible errors 
ought to have a marginal impact on the results.   
 
4.5 The Variables 
 
Since the research method of this study is influenced by Anderson & Reeb (2003), many of 
their variables have been directly duplicated into this study. However, a few variable changes 
were made in order to suite our take on the subject matter; among others the merge of non-
founder controlled family firms. All variables are explained and motivated through the 
following sections below.  
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4.5.1 Dependent Variables 
 
We use two metrics to measure performance in our study: Return on Asset (ROA) and Tobin’s 
Q (TQ). The two variables are defined in in table 4.1 below.  
 
Dependent Variables Description of Variables 
Return on asset (ROA) Pre-tax net income / Total assets 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) (Market capitalization + Book value of debt) 
/ Total assets 
Table 4.1: Description of dependent variables 
 
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, these two variables have a quite different 
approach to firm performance. ROA is defined as pre-tax
2
 net income divided by total assets, 
whereas TQ, a common proxy of firm value, is defined as market capitalization and book 
value of debt divided by total assets. These dependent variables are implied through plenty of 
family firm studies that the make the foundation of our theoretical background (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Andres, 2008; Kashmiri & 
Mahajan, 2013) and both of them are therefore relevant for us in order to obtain comparable 
results. Nevertheless, these variables are not bound to follow any eqvuivalent pattern, as they 
are determined by different factors. Since ROA is based on a firms profitability relative to its 
size, it can be described as a pure operational metric. Tobin’s Q, on the other hand, reflects 
how the market values the company and is a commonly used metric in both valuation and 
performance research. Its exact definition, however, has been subject for minor altering by 
different scholars. A common definition of Tobin’s Q is ‘enterprise value divided by the 
replacement cost of all assets’. One could argue that this is a good proxy for valuation, but the 
metric is quite difficult to manually conduct over many observations. This thesis therefore 
turn to a more common proxy of Tobin’s Q, which is much a like a market-to-book value. 
The ratio is defined as market value of debt and equity divided by total company book values. 
Conversely, given that the debt has a fixed interest rate not very different from market interest 
rates, our estimation of debt market value being equal to book value of debt is quite realistic. 
                                                 
2
 As all Swedish firms have the same fixed tax-rate, the calculations will not be biased over the sample. 
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We believe that these assumptions, on average, are applicable to our sample. They are also 
much in line with previous conducted similar resarch, e.g. Barontini & Caprio (2006).  
 
Ultimately, this study will measure performance through a two-folded dimension: Operational 
performance (ROA) and Market performance (TQ), as noted in the hypotheses.  
 
4.5.2 Control Variables  
 
In all of our regressions we will use five control variables, all of which are described in table 
4.2 
 
Control Variable Description 
LN (Sales) The natural logarithm of total sales 
LN (Age) The natural logarithm of firm age 
LTD / Tot. Assets Long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Div. Yield. Dividend divided by the book-value of equity 
Unaffiliated block holders The sum of unaffiliated block holders that hold 
at least 5 % of votes. 
Table 4.2: Description of control variables 
 
In almost every study of this type there is a control for company size, often by the use of total 
assets or total sales. Since our dependent variables are calculated by using total assets, we 
chose to use total sales to control for size, which ought to be less correlated. We also chose to 
include firm age as a control variable since one could argue there are both advantages and 
disadvantages depending on every life-stage of a company, e.g. for a young firm that enjoy 
entrepreneurial benefits but suffers from market inexperience. Long-term debt or leverage is 
also commonly used in other similar performance studies and the argument that it ought to 
explain a part of performance and valuation seems rather straightforward. We also control for 
dividend since the signalling effects of dividend ought to be a driver of firm market value and 
high performance.  
Further, much in line with Anderson & Reeb, we include a variable called unaffiliated block 
holders that ought to have an influence on both firm performance and family control. This 
variable is calculated as the sum of voting percentage from block holders that hold more than 
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5 % of votes and have no close ties to other block holders, directors or managers. To collect 
this data, we use annual report statements for three years of the time period: 2009, 2011 and 
2013 to capture the change in the variable. Note that this variable is not to be confused with 
our research variable wedge, which measures the difference in voting rights and cash flow 
rights.  
 
4.5.3 Variables Used for Testing of the Hypotheses 
 
The following table (4.3) provides a list of the variables that will be used to test for our 
hypotheses. The table introduces each variable with a brief description, its connected 
hypothesis and the expected outcome.  
 
Research 
Variable 
Description Hypothesis and Expected Sign 
Family 
Firm 
A dummy variable indicating family 
firm classification 
H1a-b: Positive impact on operation- 
and market performance. 
Founder 
Active 
A dummy variable indicating control 
through a founding family member 
H2a-b: Most positive impact on 
operation- and market performance 
among family firms 
Non-
Founder 
A dummy variable indicating control 
through a descendant family member 
or a hired management 
 H2a-b: Less positive impact on 
operation- and market performance 
than the active founder variable.  
Age 
Dummy 
A dummy variable that indicates if 
the firm was founded at least 50 years 
before the time period  
H3a-b: Positive impact on operation- 
and market performance on all firms.  
Wedge The difference in voting ownership 
and cash flow ownership of the 
largest owner.  
H4a-b: Positive impact on operation- 
and market performance on all firms. 
Table 4.3: Description of research variables 
 
The family firm variable is rather straightforward: the variable takes on the value one if the 
firm classifies as a family firm and zero if the definition criteria are not met (for family firm 
definition, see chapter 3 – ‘defining the family firm’). In addition, we investigate the founder 
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effect by dividing all family firms into two dummy variable subcategories. Founder active is a 
dummy variable that will take the value of one if the founder of the family firm is still acting 
in the TMT or on the board of directors. Likewise, if the company had multiple founders, the 
presence of any of these founders will suffice to reach the criterion. If a family firm have 
acquired a significant number of shares in another firm and that firm thus qualifies as a family 
firm as well, the founder of the acquiring firm is accounted for in the dummy variable. The 
next classification, non-founder, takes on the value one if there is no founder present in the 
family firm. Instead a descendant, heir or closely related family member to the founder is 
acting in the TMT or on the board of directors. A non-founder classification could also 
indicate a hired management, i.e. the family does not enjoy any direct managerial power over 
the firm, but the firm still qualifies as a family firm through their voting ownership. As 
mentioned earlier though, these two non-founder subcategories have been merged together in 
this thesis due to the low amount of hired management family firms.   
Further, to get a better understanding of the founder effect, we test for firm age by applying 
the same dummy variable as Anderson & Reeb (2003), which will take on the value one of 
the firm is at least 50 years old. We argue that this time frame ought to be long (short) enough 
to be comparable to the founder effect. Lastly, we calculate firm wedge by subtracting the 
voting ownership by the cash flow rights of the largest owner in every company. Just as our 
unaffiliated block holder variable, the change in wedge was estimated through three annual 
reports of all firms: 2009, 2011 and 2013.  
 
4.6 Adjustment for Outliers 
 
In order to get a reliable and standardized dataset, we chose to exclude some outliers in the 
sample, i.e. extreme values. The observations we defined as outliers had a ROA value higher 
than 50 % or lower than -50 %, or a Tobin’s Q above 10 or below 0.1.  
 
4.7 Industry and Time Adjustment 
 
In a performance study, adjusting for time and industry can mitigate any biased results. Such 
bias could be the result of, e.g. high concentration of family firms in a relatively well 
Magnus Damberg and Rasmus Ilestedt 
 
- 41 - 
 
performing industry. Also, adjusting for time is of particular importance for this study, since 
the recession ultimately strikes different industries at different times and at different strength.  
 
 
Industry ROA Raw 
Materials 
Industrial Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Service 
Technology & 
Telecom 
Average 3,5 % 
 
6,1 % 6,3 % 
 
7,4 % 
 
7,7 % 
 
Median 3,3 % 
 
7,2 % 
 
4,9 % 
 
7,1 % 
 
8,6 % 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
11,7 % 
 
11,2 % 
 
9,6 % 
 
13,5 % 
 
13,9 % 
 
 
Industry TQ Raw 
Materials 
Industrial Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Service 
Technology & 
Telecom 
Average 0,93 
 
1,27 
 
0,94 
 
1,43 
 
1,47 
 
Median 0,58 
 
0,91 
 
0,75 
 
0,95 
 
0,94 
 
Standard deviation 1,02 
 
1,46 
 
0,78 
 
1,44 
 
1,51 
 
      
N (number of firm 
years) 
60 295 80 110 150 
Table 4.4: Industry Performance according to NASDAQ industry classification, adjusted for outliers.  
 
Table 4.4 demonstrates the average value, median value and standard deviations of ROA and 
Tobin’s Q for the industries included the sample, adjusted for outliers. As one can identify, 
the performance differs between industries and we therefore adjust every observation of ROA 
and Tobin’s Q with the industry average for that particular year. This ought to mitigate both 
the bias of temporal macroeconomic swings in any particular year, as well as the excess 
performance of any given industry.  
All firms in the sample have been sorted into industries according to the industry list provided 
by Nasdaq OMX Nordic. Due to the low firm frequency in the telecom industry, these 
observations were merged together with those of the technology industry. Next, every 
observation has been subtracted with the yearly industry means or estimated with its relative 
difference to the industry mean. 
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In addition to the dependent variables, total sales, dividend yield and long-term debt were also 
adjusted as they can be assumed to also systematically differ through industries and years on 
average.  
 
4.8 Method of Analysis 
 
Again, we aim to analyse our results through both descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis. Standard regression models are commonly used through performance research, e.g. 
Anderson & Reeb (2003), Villalonga et al (2006) and Kashmiri & Mahajan (2013). 
Therefore, the regression analysis applied in this study will be a panel data regression model 
(ordinary least squares), more specifically influenced by the ones of Anderson & Reeb (2003) 
and Villalonga et al (2006).  
In accordance with the variables explained and defined earlier, we specify the following basic 
regression model:  
 
 
𝛾 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) +  𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒) +  𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 
 
This specification is quite different from previous research conducted in the research field, but 
then again the aim of our study is not exactly the same as e.g. Anderson & Reeb. Ultimately, 
most studies apply their own take on the basic regression specification and we argue that our 
specification ought to capture the majority of the dependant variable elements in a recession. 
In addition to this basic specification, we will include more variables in different regressions 
to test for our hypotheses, all of which are defined in earlier table 4.3.  
 
4.9 Ordinary Least Squares Methodology Assumptions  
 
For an ordinary least squares (OLS) methodology to be applicable, a few assumptions 
regarding the dataset have to be fulfilled.   
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Brooks (2014) lists five criteria that have to be met in order for OLS modelling to be 
appropriate. In this section, you find a comprehensive definition of these criteria and how we 
control for them.  
 
I. E(ut)  
 
The first criterion implies that the average error term in the regression has to be zero. We will 
prevent for this by including an intercept in all of our regressions.  
 
II. Var(ut) = σ
2
 < ∞ 
 
The second criterion refers to how the error term must have constant variance, often referred 
to as homoscedasticity. If this condition is violated, estimators may yield false interpretations, 
also known as heteroscedasticity. We perform Breusch-Pagan tests on the regressions to 
check for heteroscedasticity. If the p-value of the f-test is significant at a 5 % level we apply 
White’s covariance matrix to correct for the heteroscedasticity. These tests are attached in the 
appendix (A.1) at the end of the thesis.  
 
 
III. Cov(uj,uj) = 0 
 
Brooks’ third criterion refers to autocorrelation in the regression, e.g. a phenomena where 
residuals in the regression are dependent on each other. In such an event, the beta coefficient 
becomes inefficient, which may result in false interpretations. However, testing for 
autocorrelation by using Breusch-Godfrey tests is mainly applicable on time-series data and 
not commonly used on panel data. Further, using a data series with a relatively short time 
window, such as ours, makes it difficult to observe autocorrelation trends in the variables. For 
these reasons we do not investigate autocorrelation in our dataset. 
 
IV. Cov(uj,xj) = 0 
 
The fourth criterion refers to endogeneity in the data. This means, that independent variables 
are correlated with the error term – indicating that estimators are determined within the 
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regression instead of outside of it. There is no way of entirely solving the endogeneity 
problem, but there are potential ways of adjusting for it. Still, the general understanding from 
our previous research suggests that high levels of endogeneity is not common in this type of 
research and we will therefore not adjust the data for endogeneity. We will, however, discuss 
the potential of endogeneity issues when theory indicates that such could exist.  
 
 
V. (Ut ~ N(0, σ
2
)) 
 
The last criterion implies that residuals have to be normally distributed. We illustrate the 
normality distribution of our basic regression specification in the appendix (A.2) and attach 
the Jarque-Bera tests to check the normality distribution. 
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Chapter V – Main Results 
In this chapter, we present the reader with the most important empirical findings of the thesis. 
First, we present and analyse the descriptive statistics, followed by a presentation of the OLS 
regression results. The chapter is rounded up with a discussion regarding the robustness of 
the results. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section aims to display and analyse the most essential descriptive statistics. Some of the 
most important firm characteristics are highlighted in table 5.1 (all firms) and 5.2 (only family 
firms).  
 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Observations 
ROA 6,4 % 6,8 % 12 % 690 
Tobin’s Q 1,27 0,88 1,38 693 
Sales 14 319 2001 36 652 692 
Total Assets 15 191 1595 44 940 695 
Age 55 36 51 695 
LTD/Total Assets 12,46 % 8,15 % 13,8 % 693 
Wedge 8,61 % 0 % 13,1 % 680 
Dividend Yield 3,44 2,6 4,47 691 
Unaffiliated 
holdings 
13,5 % 11,8 % 11,5 % 695 
Number of firms = 139  Maximum observations = 695 
Table 5.1: Summary of firm characteristics. All firms included. Sales and total assets are 
displayed in millions of SEK (MSEK). 
 
As noted in table 5.1, our data is unbalanced. This means, that individual firms have missing 
observations over periods of time and that a fixed-effects regression would retain certain 
drawbacks. Our specification, however, is not a fixed-effects model. This will be further 
discussed later in this chapter (5.5.2).  
Through table 5.1, one can identify that most variables appear to have higher mean values 
than median values, implying the presence of outliers in the sample. This has been adjusted 
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by the earlier mentioned approach, but is still of good importance to keep in mind whilst 
analysing the results. Before analysing any further, let us introduce another similar table – but 
this time only including the classified family firms: 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Observations 
ROA 8,33 % 8,45 % 11,7 % 310 
Tobin’s Q 1,43 1,0 1,59 310 
Sales 11 969 1680 23 606 310 
Total Assets 10 418 2000 18 458 310 
Age 55,9 37 51,6 310 
LTD/Total Assets 13,4 % 9,5 % 13,4 % 308 
Wedge 15 % 16,5 % 14,8 % 295 
Dividend Yield 3,66 3,19 3,5 310 
Unaffiliated 
holdings 
10 % 6,96 % 10,7 % 310 
Number of firms = 62  Maximum observations = 310 
Table 5.2: Summary of firm characteristics, family firms only. Sales and total assets are 
displayed in millions of SEK (MSEK). 
 
Here, we have our first indications of what characterizes the family firms in our sample. One 
can almost immediately recognize that family firms signal higher levels of performance 
through these statistics, both in ROA and Tobin’s Q. Of course, these numbers only serve as a 
suggestion of what we may expect in our regressions and one should not draw too distinct 
inferences from these statistics.  
 
Further, the values of wedge and unaffiliated holdings indicate that our assumptions regarding 
family firm’s governance mechanisms can be perceived as accurate. Family firms appear to 
be keener on translating shares into more powerful voting rights than regular block holders, a 
practice that can be confirmed by looking at the difference in wedge. In addition, the 
unaffiliated holdings appear to be lesser in family firms, which also assent to the families’ 
excessive control in comparison to other owners. Figure 5.1 illustrates the exponential relation 
between average ROA and firm wedge.  
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Figure 5.1: Average ROA illustrated in ten percentage magnitudes of ownership wedge. 
 
 
The figure displays the average ROA through different wedge levels. Zero or negative wedge 
are displayed to the far left and wedge values of fifty percentage or more are displayed to the 
far right. Much in line with expectations, there appears to be an overall positive relationship 
between wedge and operating performance. However, this is not exclusive for family firms 
and for that reason we must be extra deliberate when we analyse the final results. That is to 
say, even though it is obvious that family firms ought to have a higher wedge, our research 
may not be able to completely address whether high performance origins from the involved 
family or the excessive control per se. Still, the relationship is fluctuating, indicating that 
there may be elements within the wedge that are not explained in our data. A similar figure is 
drawn for Tobin’s Q in figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2: Average TQ illustrated in ten percentage magnitudes of ownership wedge. 
 
The relationship illustrated in figure 5.2 is slightly different to that than in figure 5.1. First, 
even though the 40 % wedge segment appears to have extraordinary TQ values, one must 
understand that observations in this segment are quite few. Secondly, as we discussed earlier, 
Tobin’s Q appears to have different performance drivers than Return on Asset, which is also 
suggested by these two figures. Also, since we believe that wedge ought to enhance 
performance in recessions, logic dictates that we can expect different results regarding 
operating- and market performance in our regression.  
 
In table 5.3, we briefly examine the average statistics of our family firm subcategories.  
 
 
 Founder Non-Founder 
ROA 8,5 % 5,2 % 
Tobin’s Q 1,48 1,37 
Age 34,8   83,2 
 
Table 5.3: Average ROA, TQ and age according to family firm subcategories.  
 
Much in line with previous research, the founder subcategory appears to be better than other 
family firms in terms of performance. However, as already highlighted, the relative difference 
in Tobin’s Q is rather narrow compared to ROA, and we therefore do not expect that the 
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regression will display a distinct founder effect in terms of market performance. Furthermore, 
just as expected, there is a significant age difference among family firms and this makes the 
contradicting age hypothesis very interesting. The value of 34,8 also indicates that our age 
dummy (50 years) is a suitable classification in order to analyse the founder effect. Still, 35 
years is a rather high mean value for firms with an active founder, indicating that our sample 
is heavily characterised by large firms. This is not surprising since our sample consists of the 
largest publicly listed firms in Sweden and logic dictates that large sized firms also ought to 
be older than small ones.  
As explained in the previous chapter, the firms in our sample are collected through the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange lists, divided into market capitalization segments called large, 
mid and small. Their respective performance metrics are displayed in the tables below.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Yearly average ROA according to public list categories. All firms included. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Yearly average TQ according to public list categories. All firms included. 
0,00%
4,00%
8,00%
12,00%
16,00%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Large Cap 7,58% 12,34% 13,08% 11,15% 10,74%
Mid Cap 6,13% 9,55% 10,46% 8,93% 8,79%
Small Cap 2,15% 2,29% 4,64% 2,83% 0,88%
Yearly Average ROA 
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Large Cap 1,26 1,79 1,55 1,92 1,91
Mid Cap 1,17 1,46 1,08 1,18 1,42
Small Cap 1,19 1,19 0,84 0,87 1,08
Yearly Average TQ 
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These figures clearly illustrate how larger public companies carry an edge in performance. 
This, we argue, is quite logical in a recession. On that note, we can confirm that 2009 was the 
most inferior year in terms of performance – also predicted in our cycle discussion earlier. 
However, these results are quite interesting for other reasons. For instance, as stated in tables 
5.1 and 5.2, family firms are smaller on average in terms of total sales and total assets but 
their performance is suggested to be superior. This could signal of the importance of the 
renowned founder effect - the theory of how young family firms in early years enjoy unique 
advantages in the presence of the company founder. For obvious reasons, family firms with an 
active founder are not as old as other family firms on average, and likewise are the largest 
public companies often quite old. An improved understanding is given in figures 5.5 and 5.6, 
which displays average ROA of all firms and family firms in a matrix of size (total sales) and 
age.  
 
 Larger Smaller 
Older 8,98 % 5,4 % 
Younger 6,64 % 4,18 % 
Figure 5.5: Average ROA in a quadrant matrix of size and age. All firms included. 
 
 Larger Smaller 
Older 9,82 % 10,0 % 
Younger 8,66 % 5, 67 % 
Figure 5.6: Average ROA in a quadrant matrix of size and age. Only family firms included. 
 
 
In the figures above, all family firms are divided into one of the four quadrants depending on 
their above- or below values of median size and age. We note in figure 5.5 that performance 
of all firms on average appear to be highly driven by firm size and firm age. Again, one would 
argue that this is rather logical in a recession – which ought to inquire resilience and 
experience. Yet, family firms do not appear to be driven by the same attributes. Among the 
older family firms, the size of the company does not indicate any particular benefit at all, and 
the age gap among larger companies is not as momentous as for all firms in the sample. 
Again, these indications suggest the positive presence of the founder effect in family firms. 
On the other hand, there is a large performance gap among smaller family firms in terms of 
Magnus Damberg and Rasmus Ilestedt 
 
- 51 - 
 
age – suggesting that the founder effect may not be as functional among smaller family firms 
in a recession. Again, logic dictates that small firms suffer through recessions and that this 
perhaps, as a consequence, mitigates the founder effect in small family firms. After all, 
previous evidence of the superior performance of founder family firms was only conducted 
during stable macroeconomic periods.  
 
Similar to the two previous figures, figure 5.7 and 5.8 display the same matrices – but this 
time by measuring average Tobin’s Q.  
 
 
 Larger Smaller 
Older 1,09 0,90 
Younger 1,59 1,48 
Figure 5.7: Average TQ in quadrant matrix of size and age. All firms included. 
 
 Larger Smaller 
Older 1,34 1,21 
Younger 2,09 1,32 
Figure 5.8: Average TQ in quadrant matrix of size and age. Only family firms included. 
 
In the two figures above, we recognize a somewhat different pattern for average TQ compared 
to the earlier average ROA. The main disparity is the indication of how young and small firms 
appear to have higher market values than the older and small ones. As discussed earlier, it is 
important for us to distinguish the more operative metric, ROA, from the more valuation-
based metric, Tobin’s Q. The indication in figure 5.8 could therefore logically suggest that the 
market values the potential of small and young firms.  
Altogether, the statistics suggests that family firms outperform the sample on average in terms 
of ROA and Tobin’s Q. Again, even though one may be tempted to draw conclusions from 
these statistics, it is important to remember that they are merely indications of what we may 
expect in our regression analysis.  
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5.2 Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
 At first glance, family firms appear to enjoy superior performance through market 
recession, both in operating terms (ROA) and market terms (TQ). However, the values 
of these metrics seems to be affected by different drivers and their outcome in the 
regression may therefore be different.  
 
 Strong control incentives (wedge) seem to have a positive effect on both ROA and TQ 
in a recession, even if their patterns are slightly different. It is not clear whether strong 
performance origins from the family firm or the strong control itself.  
 
 The positive impact of the founder effect may be mitigated in our regression analysis, 
since the key performance drivers in a recession appears to stem from size and age.  
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5.3 OLS Regression Results 
 
This section will present the outcome of our OLS regressions. Most variables are adjusted for 
time and industry in accordance to earlier explanation. 
 
 Return on Asset 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Variables Regression Coefficients 
Intercept -0,014 
(0,676) 
-0,024 
(0,518) 
-0,026 
(0,00)*** 
-0,005 
(0,854) 
0,344 
(0,395) 
0,425 
(0,526) 
-0,247 
(0,116) 
0,374 
(0,369) 
Family Firm 0,043 
(0,024)** 
   0,279 
(0,352) 
   
Founder   0,052 
(0,005)*** 
   0,065 
(0,679) 
  
Non-Founder  0,032 
(0,044)** 
   0,446 
(0,048)** 
  
Age Dummy   -0,016 
(0,225) 
   -0,188 
(0,088)* 
 
Wedge    0,12 
(0,001)*** 
   0,058 
(0,215) 
LTD/Total 
ass. 
-0,083 
(0,081)* 
-0,083 
(0,077)* 
-0,77 
(0,076)* 
-0,074 
(0,09)* 
-1,039 
(0,003)*** 
-1,046 
(0,002)*** 
-1,039 
(0,005)*** 
0,94 
(0,028)** 
Div. Yield 0,003 
(0,119) 
0,003 
(0,12) 
0,003 
(0,109) 
0,003 
(0,144) 
0,01 
(0,133) 
0,01 
(0,116) 
0,01 
(0,101) 
0,01 
(0,13) 
Ln(Sales) 0,022 
(0,00)*** 
0,023 
(0,00)*** 
0,022 
(0,00)*** 
0,022 
(0,00)*** 
0,105 
(0,264) 
0,10 
(0,30) 
0,102 
(0,305) 
0,10 
(0,296) 
Ln(Age) -0,007 
(0,207) 
-0,005 
(0,436) 
 -0,008 
(0,198) 
-0,165 
(0,079)* 
-0,183 
(0,231) 
 -0,138 
(0,16) 
Unaffiliated 
Block holders 
0,108 
(0,008)*** 
0,116 
(0,027)** 
0,069 
(0,006)*** 
0,098 
(0,00)*** 
-0,585 
(0,026)** 
-0,614 
(0,019)** 
-0,693 
(0,00)*** 
-0,724 
(0,00)*** 
         
Adj. R-square 0,485 0,484 0,479 0,482 0,72 0,719 0,72 0,718 
Observations: 695         
Regression table 5.1: Performance regressions according to hypotheses. Significance levels are 
displayed in the following fashion: 
*** = 1 % significance level 
** = 5 % significance level 
* = 10 % significance level 
 
Regression table 5.1 displays four regression specifications in a two-folded dependent 
variable approach, making for a total of eight regression outcomes. We detect positive 
significance on many important research variables for operational performance, but not as 
many in terms of market performance. Also notable is that we have a relatively high r-square, 
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which translates into a high explanation degree in the regression. This value is higher than in 
most of the previous research, e.g. Anderson & Reeb, which could depend on the fact that our 
sample is relatively small and that our time window is rather short.  
The regression also suggests that size (natural log of sales) have a distinct positive impact on 
operational performance in a recession, whereas TQ results are more tentative, which we also 
expected after analysing the descriptive statistics. Lastly, note that the control variable 
LN(Age) is excluded from our Age Dummy regression due to their obvious correlation.  
 
5.4 Validity Tests 
 
In order to strengthen the validity of these results, we have performed a number of validity 
tests. These tests are based on previous discussions in the fourth chapter (4.4 and 4.9) and 
suggested by Brooks (2014).  
 
5.4.1 Heteroscedasticity 
 
As previously mentioned, to be able to use the ordinary least squares regression model, the 
residuals must have constant variance and a violation of this criterion is called 
heteroscedasticity. The risk of heteroscedasticity increases with the inclusion of extreme 
values. To mitigate such risk, we have used the natural logarithm of sales and age, similar to 
previous research. Further, we have found heteroscedasticity in all of our regressions and 
have corrected for this by applying White’s covariance matrix, which according to Brooks 
(2014) ought to mitigate the heteroscedasticity issue.  
 
5.4.2 Multicollinearity  
 
Further, we investigate whether our independent variables are highly correlated with each 
other, often referred to as multicollinearity. If such correlation exist, there is a risk that the 
explanation degree is upwardly biased, which could ultimately result in false conclusions 
regarding generated results. However, multicollinearity requires two or more variables to 
have a high positive or negative correlation. As displayed in our correlation matrix in the 
appendix (A.4), our dataset does not appear to suffer from this issue. Even if one could note 
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that our two age variables are correlated at -0,848, these variables will not be included in the 
same regression. This applies for any highly correlated variables that are not included in the 
same regression.  
 
5.4.3 Normal Distribution  
 
Last, in studies such as this one, it is justified to examine the normality distribution of 
residuals in the regression. Again, if this criterion does not hold true, the risk of drawing false 
conclusions increases. We have concluded that none of our regressions have entirely normally 
distributed residuals, which is quite expected seeing that Anderson & Reeb (2003), who have 
2713 observations, do not produce complete normality distribution either. However, we have 
adjusted for this by eliminating outliers in accordance with discussions in 4.6, as well as 
converting total sales and firm age into logarithm values. Admittedly, one could also remedy 
the effect by including more firms in the sample or extending the sample period. However, 
including more firms is not possible since there are no more listed companies that meet our 
limitations during the sample period. Nor can we extend our time span, as this would 
minimize the recession impact, which is the primary target of investigation in our thesis.  
 
Histograms of our normality distributions can be found in the appendix (A.2). We argue that 
the histograms illustrate a sufficient normal distribution of residuals, even if the attached 
Jarque-Bera test, which shows high significance, points to the opposite. Still, we deem that 
our residuals are normally distributed enough for the methodology to serve the thesis purpose.   
 
5.5 Robustness Analysis 
 
This section will address the robustness of our results. We will do so by first examining how 
results would have differed, should we have chosen to limit the study to a single stock 
exchange. Such restrictions would have narrowed down conclusions, but also decreased our 
sample drastically. Second, we will run our regression by applying fixed effects (cross-
sectional and period). A common third robustness step is to investigate whether results are 
robust over time or not. However, seeing that our sample does not span over a large period of 
time we will not investigate this.  
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5.5.1 Sub-sample Analysis  
 
We divide the sample into three sub-samples in accordance to their respective public listing; 
large- mid and small market capitalization. Yet, one could argue that our current regression 
specification captures the size-effect by the inclusion of a control variable (the natural log of 
sales). Still, we argue that these listings are characterized by other factors than size. For 
instance, large-cap is closely supervised by other market participants, whereas mid- and 
small-cap may only by monitored by closely connected stakeholders. Moreover, we believe 
that a pure numerical measure (such as sales or assets) is not perfectly mirrored in the 
classification of stock exchange, since investors tend to generalize the segments in which the 
companies are traded. This will substantially be considered when we observe the sub-sample 
results of Tobin’s Q below, since ROA is a more accounting based measure.  
 
 Return on Asset Tobin’s Q 
 Large Cap 
Founder Family Firms -0,05 0,8 
P-value (0,0568)* (0,122) 
Other Family Firms -0,01 0,213 
P-value (0,254) (0,49) 
 Mid Cap 
Founder Family Firms 0,0639 0,499 
P-Value (0,000)*** (0,001)*** 
Other Family Firms 0,049 0,412 
P-Value (0,004)*** (0,014)** 
 Small Cap 
Founder Family Firms 0,061 0,069 
P-Value (0,001)*** (0,54) 
Other Family Firms -0,029 -0,276 
P-Value (0,32) (0,131) 
Table 5.4: Sub-sample regression of adjusted ROA and adjusted TQ.  
 
As table 5.4 indicates, the results are not robust across the three stock exchanges. What 
appears the most striking is that the presence of the company founder in family firms does not 
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seem to affect firms that are listed on the large-cap list. This could appear surprising, since 
our descriptive statistics provided a rather apparent trend of good performance in the large-
cap section. It is important to understand though, that the large-cap list is influenced by other 
factors than mere size. The firms that are traded in this segment are heavily monitored, under 
high media pressure and are expected to follow certain CSR-standards
3
. That would suggest 
that even though their operating- and market performances are good, the firms are still very 
equal and any particular family or founder effect may be hard to distinguish. Instead, the 
regression suggests that the founder effect is narrowed to the smaller list and especially mid-
cap. In that regression, both sub-categories of family firms manage to outperform other firms 
by a highly significant degree in terms of both ROA and Tobin’s Q. In fact, the family has a 
momentous positive effect on Tobin’s Q in the mid-cap segment. A possible explanation for 
this could be that the mid-cap list is large enough for investors to overlook an increased 
probability of default, but also small enough for strong family ties to remain within the 
business.  
 
While these observations are indeed interesting, it is not our main area of study in this thesis. 
The sub-sample analysis reveals how family firm theory is difficult to apply on a large and 
diversified sample. Even though one should be cautious of drawing too voluminous 
conclusions of this, it is still useful to consider when we analyse the results of the whole 
sample.  
 
5.5.2 Fixed Effects Regressions 
 
This thesis will not apply a fixed effects model in the regression to analyse the data. The 
reason for this is that we adjust our dependent variables for both time and industry and 
therefore avoid fixed effects stemming from firms that are not present over the entire time 
period. In addition, our sample period is five years with annual changes in the variable, which 
makes the fixed effects model troublesome to use due to potential lag in the variables. If this 
study had investigated a longer period of time, we would have considered using a fixed 
effects model. Still, we perform a fixed effects regression that is located in the appendix 
(A.3). It is important to remember that in fixed effect regressions, intercepts will be measured 
                                                 
3
 CSR = Corporate Social Responsibility 
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for individual companies instead of one intercept for the entire sample. A general pitfall in 
such regressions is that if a firm has only one or few observations, the results will be biased 
since the intercept explains the dependent variable to a nearly perfect extent. Even though we 
have excluded firms with only one or two observations, we still have an unbalanced dataset 
(see tables 5.1 and 5.2). This implies, that a fixed effects model would bias our results. 
Further, we can conclude that our fixed effect regression did not yield very significant results 
regarding family firm performance. However, we do not value these results as much as our 
ordinary regression results, since we have already (theoretically) captured the fixed effects by 
adjusting variables for time and industry.  
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Chapter VI – Analysis 
The sixth chapter will analyse the results of the methodology we have applied on the dataset. 
The chapter will discuss and reflect on each hypothesis in turn with help from the results and 
previous research. The chapter ends with a brief summary of the thesis hypotheses and their 
achievements on results. 
6.1 Family Firm Performance  
 
From our regression results, we find that family firms perform 4,3 % better in terms of 
operating performance during economic recession. The market value of family firms does not 
provide any significant results, even though our descriptive statistics indicated good 
performance. 
 
 
Family Firms Expected Impact Actual Impact 
ROA + + 
TQ + Insignificant 
Table 6.1: Family firms’ performance according to expectations and actual results.  
 
 
The first general understanding from these results is that they are quite in line with previous 
research on the subject. Again, we must stress the fact that ROA and Tobin’s Q have a very 
different approach to performance. ROA is mainly an accounting based performance measure, 
reflecting on investment decisions and firm operations. Tobin’s Q, on the other hand, which is 
an approximation of firm market value, rather views how investors and the market values the 
company. In other words: a firm can directly affect its operating performance, but has limited 
influence in how the market values the company. Even though our initial expectation was that 
family firms produce higher TQ, this supposition was softened by the descriptive statistics, 
which displayed rather shifting findings. Altogether, Tobin’s Q displays generally 
insignificant results throughout our regression. Nevertheless, ROA and TQ have displayed 
different results in similar studies before (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Lee, 2006), but at this 
point the insignificance of TQ may be a consequence of the unstable market conditions of our 
sample period. One could argue that the operative advantage (ROA) stems from leadership 
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and management – qualities that are unaffected by cycles. Investors, however, may value 
other factors that are more firm specific. This would imply a difficulty for the regression 
analysis to find a significant nexus, especially during such a short time period of high market 
uncertainty.  
 
Additionally, one should not ignore the fact that Cronqvist & Nilsson (2003) found that 
Swedish family firms performed worse than non-family firms. Even though we find no such 
evidence, it is quite striking how a renowned Swedish family firm study shows negative 
evidence, whilst in most other Western countries, TQ appears to be positive in its relation to 
family firms. This is interesting, since we established that the family ownership in Sweden is 
very frequent and research therefore requires a rather strict family firm classification such as 
ours. By the same token, Villalonga (2006) pointed out how results shifted drastically by the 
altering of family firm classification. This could suggest that our narrow family firm 
classification is perhaps more likely to produce different results relative to foreign studies on 
the same subject. A reason for this could be that minority shareholders demand a premium in 
order to invest in family controlled firms that are defined through such high ownership, since 
the family may be unwilling to give up control over the company. That would imply that 
family firm TQ values are not as distinguishable as in previous research with a less strict 
classification, e.g. the 5 % classification of Anderson & Reeb (2003). 
 
Regardless of this, we have found that family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of 
operating performance. This advantageous performance could stem from earlier theories of 
how family firms put in that extra effort in order for the firm to remain viable in times of 
economic recession, suggested by Brokaw & Murphy (1992). Another interpretation of 
beneficial operations is that the family understands the business and that family members 
view themselves as stewards of the firm. Altogether, we believe it is interesting that the 
competitive advantages that are highlighted in previous studies are applicable to our sample 
period as well. Notable though is that size (sales) displays a highly positive impact on 
operating performance, which further strengthens that our sample period may inquire other 
performance drivers, since earlier studies point to no such obvious relationship.  
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6.2 Founder Performance 
 
Our findings show that the founder effect is present and has a positive effect on operational 
firm performance. This was suggested in our descriptive section as well and is therefore quite 
expected. Altogether, family firms (regardless of control) outperform non-family firms, but 
with an active founder they perform at their best. Our main suggestion is much in line 
previous research: positive performance stem from the entrepreneurial abilities and work 
mentality of the company founder. What is interesting in our study though, is that these 
founder skills appear to be present in recessional times as well, even though one could suggest 
that such abilities could be mitigated by other factors. This, we argue, suggests that the 
founder effect is also observable through rough market conditions. The presence of the 
founder during high market uncertainty can send a signal of unity throughout the entire 
organization, increasing the morale of both managers and employees.  
 
Again, however, we find no support regarding founder effect on firm market performance. 
Still, theory suggests that young, entrepreneurial firms should be valued at a higher multiple 
due to their future earnings potential, especially with an active founder. However, a possible 
reason for the insignificant results may be that we only include relatively large firms that have 
already gone public. Our descriptive section suggested that size and age were drivers of 
market valuation during recession and that this could dampen the founder effect on our 
sample as a whole. Logic further suggests that competitive advantages in a recession mainly 
stems from the access to capital markets and managerial experience.  Altogether, we do not 
rule out that the founder effect is affecting market performance of some companies in our 
sample, since our descriptive statistics displayed interesting trends. However, the results are 
too inconclusive to draw any general inference regarding the founder effect and market 
performance in Swedish public firms.  
 
6.2.1 Firm Age 
 
Our age variable does not yield significant results and we therefore reject the hypotheses of 
how age boosts firm performance in a recession. This is similar to the results of Panunzi et al, 
who found no significant relationship between firm age and performance. Anderson & Reeb 
found positive results in both young and old firms, although their classification was based 
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purely on family firms. As discussed earlier though, we find it preferable to include all firms 
in our age variable to find out if the age factor is universally important across firms. However, 
by rejection of this hypothesis we can further strengthen the impact of the founder effect. That 
is to say, there is no conclusive result indicating that low firm age alone is enough to account 
for the positives that the founder effect has on firm performance. Then again, this may only be 
feasible on our time period and sample. 
  
6.3 Wedge 
 
The regression displays that ownership wedge has a highly significant, positive impact on 
operating performance. This result was much in line with previous research (Panunzi et al, 
2006) as well as our descriptive section and is therefore not altogether surprising. Admittedly 
though, this variable has the potential of being endogenous. The reason for this is, that 
profitable firms may be reluctant to give away voting rights, whilst simultaneously voting 
rights per se can create profit. Such endogeneity problem is more commonly referred to as 
simultaneity, suggesting that the dependant variable and at least one of the independent 
variables may affect each other. Cronqvist & Nilsson (2003) concluded that Swedish family 
firms are 1,5 - 2 times more likely to apply control-enhancing mechanisms that create wedge. 
This is supported in our data, as 72 % of wedge observations stem from family ownership. 
Ultimately, since family firms enjoy advantageous operating performance, the question 
remains: Does good performance stem from family control or the excessive voting rights 
themselves? Our methodology is limited in this approach, and so we cannot make any 
conclusions regarding the positive force of family firm performance. Also, the recession that 
we investigate is relatively unexplored with few studies on how firms in general were 
affected. Perhaps future research will suggest that strong ownership mechanisms were a 
successful strategy for navigating the recession. We do not wish to make any such a 
statement, but can put forth an indication from the Swedish market that ownership wedge 
definitely played its part in creating positive operating results in public firms.  
 
Again, however, we find no such evidence regarding market performance and so we reject the 
hypothesis that performance ought to be increased by enhanced voting rights. One could of 
course argue how Sweden again provides an interesting case, especially as Cronqvist & 
Nilsson (2003) display evidence of how wedge has negative impact on firm value. Our 
Magnus Damberg and Rasmus Ilestedt 
 
- 63 - 
 
inconclusive results regarding TQ could, as already explained, be due to several different 
factors, such as; use of a different sample, other market conditions or slightly different 
methodology. Furthermore, as mentioned, there is reason to believe that family firms 
inherently possess incentives of protecting their control. Therefore, in line with Porter’s 
theory of shorter investment horizons (1992), logic suggests that investors look for more firm 
specific attributes in a recession. Such intuition would imply that TQ has very firm- and 
market specific determinants, which could be the main reason for why our market 
performance metric yield altogether less significant results than ROA.  
 
6.4 Summary of Analysis 
 
After analysing the results, we arrive at the following hypothesis conclusions: 
 
Hypothesis Status 
H1a: Family firms perform better than non-family firms during recession in terms of 
operating performance. 
Not Rejected 
H1b: Family firms perform better than non-family firms during economic recession in 
terms of market performance 
Rejected 
H2a: Family firms with an active founder perform better than other family firms in 
terms of operating performance during recession. 
Not Rejected 
H2b: Family firms with an active founder perform better than other family firms in 
terms of market performance during recession. 
Rejected 
H3a: Firm age has a positive impact on overall operating performance during 
recession. 
Rejected 
H3b: Firm age has a positive impact on overall market performance during recession. Rejected 
H4a: Enhanced ownership voting control has a positive impact on overall firm 
operating performance during recession. 
Not Rejected 
H4b: Enhanced ownership voting control has a positive impact on overall firm market 
performance during recession. 
Rejected 
Table 6.2: Summary of hypothesis conclusions 
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Chapter VII – Conclusion 
The seventh and final chapter of this thesis will briefly conclude and discuss the findings of 
the study. The chapter ends with propositions of further research in the family business 
research field.   
7.1 Concluding Analysis  
 
This section aims to conclude the analyses made in the previous chapter. Again, we stress the 
fact that in family firm studies, the results are dependent on the criteria of which we chose to 
classify family firms. The reader should therefore be careful if trying to link our evidence to a 
different sample or an alternative methodology.  
Nevertheless, we conclude that by our classification and time period, family firms possess 
operative advantages in terms of performance. Still, we take great caution in this statement 
since there are a few underlying uncertainty factors. For instance, we find that enhanced 
voting rights have a very strong impact on operations as well, but with a potential for 
endogeneity. This implies that we cannot directly support earlier theories behind the family 
advantages, since we are not convinced that it is the family itself that drives the performance. 
In addition, one should be cautious of drawing too universal inferences of these empirics, 
since our study together with supportive evidence are substantially based on a Western 
economic framework. For instance, Faccio et al (2001) reported that family ownership in East 
Asian industries mainly hampers firm performance. Further, Faccio suggested that the 
problems faced by these family firms were mainly related to the political and regulatory 
market environment.  
In sum though, our results imply that in regulated and transparent markets, public family 
firms possess an advantage in terms of operating performance.  
 
Moreover, our evidence implies that the founder effect has a positive impact on firm operating 
performance. This, we argue, is more conclusive, since the process of identifying such firms 
include finding the name of founder through corporate statements and cross checking through 
annual statements, which means that we can be relatively certain that the observations are 
valid. However, our sub-sample revealed that the robustness of the founder effect was not 
equally significant across lists, which suggests that firm size has an important effect on firm 
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performance during recession. Regarding firm market performance, however, we do not 
manage to distinguish any family advantage or founder effect.  
 
7.2 Further Research 
 
The family business research field is still in a development process, since there has been no 
definite consensus among scholars of the family firm classification. Henceforth, the field has 
suffered a lot of critique regarding its credibility. We argue, that in line with business 
globalization, family firm research ultimately ought to become more comparable and 
therefore minimize the credibility gap. In addition, as investment horizons are shifting and 
market conditions are still uncertain, extended research of family ownership ought to be 
contributing for corporate governance theory. However, in contrast to our thesis and previous 
research, future research should try to single out the factors that contribute to the success of 
family firms. The positive results that are accumulated from family ownership and 
management are difficult to observe as a pure metric, but another type of methodology may 
be able to distinguish the unique characteristics that translate into good performance, possibly 
with the use of survey data. A starting frame of reference could be to thoroughly investigate 
the characteristics highlighted by Habbershon & Williams (1999) and illustrated in figure 2.1. 
 
In like manner, it appears to be a consensus regarding how active company founders have a 
positive impact on firm performance and future research could therefore focus on explaining 
why founder firms are presented as superior. Such research could be approached empirically 
by checking for demographic background or other differentiating factors that could explain 
the founder success.  
 
Furthermore, there appears to a general research gap regarding public firm performance of the 
recent recession. Since all cycles have their unique characteristics, they are important subjects 
of study in their own right. This thesis shed some light on how firms managed to endure 
through this period thus far. Yet, it is still not obvious whether our time window was 
sufficient to cover the full extent of the recession. Therefore, a valid point of future research 
would be to extend the window in order to completely capture and distinguish the effects of 
this recession.  
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We also argue that our inconclusive market performance results ought to be an interesting 
point of departure for future research. As suggested, in a peculiar time period such as ours, the 
market seeks for other drivers of firm value, or perhaps the Swedish market pays no particular 
consideration of family firms. Future research could therefore try to deepen the understanding 
of how the Swedish market values different types of ownership. Our evidence indicates that 
strong ownership incentives have a positive effect on firm operations, regardless of ownership 
type. As Sweden provides a high frequency of family firms and the majority of these apply a 
separation of control and cash flow rights, future research should seek to separate the family 
impact from the control rights.  
 
On a final note, we argue that our evidence ought to be of good contribution for future 
research of family firms. The global markets have changed a lot since most of the previous 
studies regarding family firms, which were substantially conducted around the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century. In line with globalisation and closing market gaps, we believe that future 
cycles will be even more uniform on a global level. This means that future research ought to 
be even more comparable, as the differences across markets are decreasing.  
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Appendices  
A.1 Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
ROA – Family Firm (dummy) 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID01^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 15:11   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 139   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 681  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ADJUSTED_LTD_TOT_ASS -0.001794 0.009147 -0.196161 0.8445 
ADJUSTED_DIV_YIELD 0.000148 0.000266 0.554932 0.5791 
ADJUSTED__LN_SALES -0.001818 0.000712 -2.555611 0.0108 
LN_AGE -0.002222 0.001327 -1.674919 0.0944 
UNAFFILIATED_BLOCKHOLDIN -0.029648 0.010304 -2.877280 0.0041 
FAMILY_FIRM -0.006454 0.002385 -2.705894 0.0070 
C 0.028204 0.005269 5.352475 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.042017    Mean dependent var 0.013214 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033489    S.D. dependent var 0.030142 
S.E. of regression 0.029633    Akaike info criterion -4.189615 
Sum squared resid 0.591859    Schwarz criterion -4.143117 
Log likelihood 1433.564    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.171618 
F-statistic 4.926970    Durbin-Watson stat 1.205748 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000060    
     
     
 
 
Tobin’s Q – Family Firm (dummy) 
  
Dependent Variable: RESID02^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 15:20   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 139   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 686  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ADJUSTED_LTD_TOT_ASS 1.037862 0.417729 2.484534 0.0132 
ADJUSTED_DIV_YIELD -0.028702 0.012158 -2.360688 0.0185 
ADJUSTED__LN_SALES -0.093563 0.032320 -2.894923 0.0039 
LN_AGE -0.143007 0.060560 -2.361396 0.0185 
UNAFFILIATED_BLOCKHOLDIN -1.029501 0.469378 -2.193332 0.0286 
FAMILY_FIRM -0.034674 0.108434 -0.319769 0.7492 
C 1.392261 0.240048 5.799936 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.054432    Mean dependent var 0.715598 
Adjusted R-squared 0.046076    S.D. dependent var 1.385729 
S.E. of regression 1.353428    Akaike info criterion 3.453310 
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Sum squared resid 1243.770    Schwarz criterion 3.499543 
Log likelihood -1177.485    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.471198 
F-statistic 6.514443    Durbin-Watson stat 0.705427 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
     
     
 
 
 
ROA – Founder or Non-Founder 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID03^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 15:23   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 139   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 681  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ADJUSTED_LTD_TOT_ASS -0.000715 0.009140 -0.078192 0.9377 
ADJUSTED_DIV_YIELD 0.000154 0.000266 0.580225 0.5620 
ADJUSTED__LN_SALES -0.001978 0.000723 -2.735643 0.0064 
LN_AGE -0.002664 0.001356 -1.964401 0.0499 
UNAFFILIATED_BLOCKHOLDIN -0.032600 0.010418 -3.129234 0.0018 
FOUNDER_CEO -0.009020 0.002913 -3.096068 0.0020 
NON_FOUNDER_CEO -0.003431 0.003123 -1.098443 0.2724 
C 0.030272 0.005428 5.576705 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.044774    Mean dependent var 0.013201 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034839    S.D. dependent var 0.030071 
S.E. of regression 0.029542    Akaike info criterion -4.194317 
Sum squared resid 0.587355    Schwarz criterion -4.141177 
Log likelihood 1436.165    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.173749 
F-statistic 4.506501    Durbin-Watson stat 1.221400 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000064    
     
     
 
TQ – Founder or Non-Founder  
Dependent Variable: RESID04^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 15:25   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 139   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 686  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ADJUSTED_LTD_TOT_ASS 1.012127 0.418665 2.417509 0.0159 
ADJUSTED_DIV_YIELD -0.029323 0.012174 -2.408687 0.0163 
ADJUSTED__LN_SALES -0.086516 0.032897 -2.629889 0.0087 
LN_AGE -0.130974 0.062085 -2.109594 0.0353 
UNAFFILIATED_BLOCKHOLDIN -0.889254 0.475765 -1.869104 0.0620 
FOUNDER_CEO 0.053465 0.132765 0.402706 0.6873 
NON_FOUNDER_CEO -0.126803 0.142397 -0.890487 0.3735 
C 1.323394 0.247876 5.338926 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.055629    Mean dependent var 0.713980 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.045879    S.D. dependent var 1.385493 
S.E. of regression 1.353338    Akaike info criterion 3.454618 
Sum squared resid 1241.773    Schwarz criterion 3.507457 
Log likelihood -1176.934    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.475062 
F-statistic 5.705435    Durbin-Watson stat 0.694740 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
     
     
 
ROA – Age (dummy) 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID05^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 15:28   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 139   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 681  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ADJUSTED_LTD_TOT_ASS -0.005514 0.009190 -0.600073 0.5487 
ADJUSTED_DIV_YIELD 0.000141 0.000268 0.526314 0.5988 
ADJUSTED__LN_SALES -0.002063 0.000717 -2.876456 0.0041 
UNAFFILIATED_BLOCKHOLDIN -0.022278 0.009950 -2.238963 0.0255 
AGE_DUMMY -0.002434 0.002532 -0.961202 0.3368 
C 0.017684 0.002061 8.581347 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.031065    Mean dependent var 0.013571 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023887    S.D. dependent var 0.030157 
S.E. of regression 0.029794    Akaike info criterion -4.180235 
Sum squared resid 0.599193    Schwarz criterion -4.140380 
Log likelihood 1429.370    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.164809 
F-statistic 4.328184    Durbin-Watson stat 1.197018 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000696    
     
     
 
TQ – Age (dummy) 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID06^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 15:30   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 139   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 686  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ADJUSTED_LTD_TOT_ASS 0.968949 0.400033 2.422172 0.0157 
ADJUSTED_DIV_YIELD -0.024790 0.011646 -2.128697 0.0336 
ADJUSTED__LN_SALES -0.084965 0.031080 -2.733754 0.0064 
UNAFFILIATED_BLOCKHOLDIN -0.925738 0.432557 -2.140150 0.0327 
AGE_DUMMY -0.302111 0.110190 -2.741727 0.0063 
C 0.974115 0.089307 10.90752 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.055554    Mean dependent var 0.715204 
Adjusted R-squared 0.048610    S.D. dependent var 1.329884 
S.E. of regression 1.297159    Akaike info criterion 3.366938 
Sum squared resid 1144.182    Schwarz criterion 3.406566 
Magnus Damberg and Rasmus Ilestedt 
 
- 74 - 
 
Log likelihood -1148.860    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.382271 
F-statistic 7.999827    Durbin-Watson stat 0.752788 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
ROA – Wedge 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID07^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 15:32   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 136   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 666  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ADJUSTED_LTD_TOT_ASS -0.006020 0.009242 -0.651363 0.5150 
ADJUSTED_DIV_YIELD 0.000234 0.000270 0.867526 0.3860 
ADJUSTED__LN_SALES -0.001674 0.000717 -2.333394 0.0199 
LN_AGE -0.002105 0.001337 -1.573848 0.1160 
UNAFFILIATED_BLOCKHOLDIN -0.031686 0.010782 -2.938665 0.0034 
WEDGE -0.021362 0.009329 -2.289740 0.0224 
C 0.027426 0.005253 5.221555 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.040139    Mean dependent var 0.013591 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031400    S.D. dependent var 0.030217 
S.E. of regression 0.029739    Akaike info criterion -4.182290 
Sum squared resid 0.582808    Schwarz criterion -4.134979 
Log likelihood 1399.702    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.163959 
F-statistic 4.592958    Durbin-Watson stat 1.244943 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000140    
     
     
 
TQ – Wedge 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID08^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 15:33   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 136   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 671  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ADJUSTED_LTD_TOT_ASS 0.830684 0.417368 1.990292 0.0470 
ADJUSTED_DIV_YIELD -0.025022 0.012175 -2.055220 0.0402 
ADJUSTED__LN_SALES -0.086932 0.032230 -2.697234 0.0072 
LN_AGE -0.121506 0.060363 -2.012898 0.0445 
UNAFFILIATED_BLOCKHOLDIN -1.250763 0.485714 -2.575102 0.0102 
WEDGE -0.077511 0.420463 -0.184348 0.8538 
C 1.342649 0.236718 5.671936 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.049615    Mean dependent var 0.723627 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041027    S.D. dependent var 1.371600 
S.E. of regression 1.343169    Akaike info criterion 3.438318 
Sum squared resid 1197.924    Schwarz criterion 3.485354 
Log likelihood -1146.556    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.456536 
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F-statistic 5.777343    Durbin-Watson stat 0.744754 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000007    
     
     
 
A.2 Normal Distribution Tests 
 
Adjusted ROA 
 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 
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A.3 Fixed Effects Regressions 
 
 
 Return on Asset 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Variables Regression Coefficients 
Intercept 0,303 
(0,345) 
-0,024 
(0,518) 
0,001 
(0,989) 
0,297 
(0,349) 
-0,259 
(0,847) 
-0,219 
(0,871) 
-0,247 
(0,116) 
-0,236 
(0,861) 
Family Firm -0,0254 
(0,183) 
   0,137 
(0,072)* 
   
Founder   -0,099 
(0,001)*** 
   -0,241 
(0,144) 
  
Non Founder  -0,025 
(0,20) 
   0,14 
(0,068)* 
  
Age Dummy   0,036 
(0,323) 
   0,016 
(0,225) 
 
Wedge    -0,115 
(0,374) 
   -0,254 
(0,611) 
LTD/Total 
ass. 
-0,054 
(0,446) 
-0,051 
(0,471) 
-0,034 
(0,535) 
-0,053 
(0,464) 
-1,639 
(0,001)*** 
-1,626 
(0,001)*** 
-1,641 
(0,001)*** 
-1,563 
(0,001)*** 
Div. Yield 0,001 
(0,944) 
0,001 
(0,948) 
0,001 
(0,977) 
0,001 
(0,959) 
0,001 
(0,785) 
0,001 
(0,78) 
-0,001 
(0,807) 
0,002 
(0,748) 
Ln(Sales) -0,002 
(0,92) 
-0,002 
(0,91) 
-0,006 
(0,788) 
-0,004 
(0,858) 
0,085 
(0,453) 
0,083 
(0,461) 
0,085 
(0,454) 
0,08 
(0,482) 
Ln(Age) -0,075 
(0,396) 
-0,072 
(0,415) 
 -0,073 
(0,403) 
0,039 
(0,917) 
0,053 
(0,887) 
 -0,031 
(0,934) 
Unaffiliated 
Block holders 
0,098 
(0,097) 
0,092 
(0,299) 
-0,095 
(0,28) 
-0,108 
(0,209) 
-0.414 
(0,149) 
-0,386 
(0,179) 
-0,399 
(0,163) 
-0,45 
(0,128) 
Cross-section fixed         
Period Fixed        
Adj. R-
square 
0,556 0,484 0,555 0,556 0,72 0,719 0,786 0,785 
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A.4 Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Correlation           
Probability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
TQ  1.000           
 -----            
            
ROA  0.411 1.000          
 0.000 -----           
            
LTD / TOT ASS  -0.171 -0.060 1.000         
 0.000 0.122 -----          
            
DIV YIELD  -0.128 0.063 0.085 1.000        
 0.001 0.103 0.028 -----         
            
(LN)SALES  -0.134 0.218 0.287 0.139 1.000       
 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -----        
            
(LN)AGE  -0.157 0.067 0.076 0.113 0.406 1.000      
 0.000 0.084 0.049 0.003 0.000 -----       
            
UNAFFILIATED BLOCKHOLDIN  -0.138 -0.034 0.026 0.036 0.023 0.011 1.000     
 0.000 0.387 0.502 0.350 0.547 0.769 -----      
            
FAMILY FIRM  0.097 0.143 0.062 0.042 0.027 0.044 -0.290 1.000    
 0.013 0.000 0.112 0.278 0.480 0.257 0.000 -----     
            
FOUNDER CEO  0.066 0.063 0.032 0.020 -0.196 -0.200 -0.326 0.651 1.000   
 0.091 0.105 0.411 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -----    
            
NON FOUNDER CEO  0.050 0.112 0.043 0.031 0.250 0.276 -0.009 0.550 -0.276 1.000  
 0.196 0.004 0.269 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.827 0.000 0.000 -----   
            
WEDGE  0.011 0.113 0.016 0.097 0.068 0.072 -0.322 0.421 0.418 0.073 1.000 
 
